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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation analyzes the circumstances under which intellectual property rights
affect a developing or emerging country’s ability to catch up to the developed world.
Chapter 2 presents a model which explains the empirically observed threshold level
of intellectual property rights (IPRs) below which IPRs fail to stimulate innovation
and per capita income and above which there is a positive correlation between IPRs
and these variables. After explaining this empirical observation, the model is used to
compare the consequences of different IPR setting strategies for developing countries.
Chapter 3 develops a model to examine the effects of IPRs on the knowledge transfer
from developed to developing countries. It points out the circumstances under which
policies of weak intellectual property protection can benefit a developing country’s
research sector. In chapter 4, an empirical analysis is conducted which aims at
identifying the aspects of IPRs which can explain per-capita income differences
across countries in the data. In the following, I give a short summary of the main
results of this dissertation.
The previous literature focuses on North-South setups in which the South, i.e. de-
veloping countries, is restricted to imitative activity and all products are designed
in the North, i.e. developed countries (see Grossman and Helpman (1991a); Dear-
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dorff (1992); Helpman (1993) and more recently Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010,
2011)). These assumptions contradict the recent data on R&D in developing coun-
tries: Developing countries employ almost two fifth of the world’s researchers, orig-
inate almost one quarter of world expenditures on R&D, and their inventions are
subject to imitation (OECD, 2008; UNESCO, 2010). To study the effects of intellec-
tual property rights (IPRs) on development, innovation and the southern catch-up
process, theoretical work has to account for these empirical patterns.
In chapter 2 of this dissertation, "Imitation and Innovation Driven Development un-
der Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights",1 a North-South increasing variety model
of non-scale growth is developed to match these empirical findings. In contrast to
the previous literature, we allow not only for southern R&D and the imitation of
northern goods, but also imitation targeted at southern innovations. We account
for research efficiency differences between the two regions and allow the South’s
research sector to be less developed than the northern one. To obtain policy recom-
mendations about the effect of national treatment IPR policies versus discriminatory
policies protecting mainly domestic firms, we endow the South with the possibility
to set different IPR levels for domestic and foreign innovations.
We find the effects of IPRs on R&D and welfare to be non-monotonic and dependent
on R&D efficiency and initial conditions. For sufficiently strong IPRs the South en-
gages in R&D. In this case, a further strengthening of IPRs for all innovators is shown
to promote southern R&D and welfare, and to be able to reduce the North-South
wage gap. In countries in which the research efficiency is low and thus no research
sector exists, a strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights below a threshold level
fails to promote R&D. In this case, it decreases welfare and wages since the loss
due to more difficult imitation is not compensated by the benefits of increases in
own R&D. We find that discriminatory southern IPR policies (increases in IPRs for
1 This chapter is based on the paper "Imitation and Innovation Driven Development under
Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights", Lorenczik and Newiak (2011).
2
southern goods only) do not harm either of the two regions if the South does not en-
gage in innovation, but can provide the necessary environment for southern firms to
start original R&D. As soon as the South engages in innovation, discriminatory IPR
policies benefit both regions by raising the South’s R&D incentives and therefore
shifting its resources away from the imitation of northern goods.
One of the conclusions of chapter 2 is that the success of IPR policies depends cru-
cially on the southern research efficiency, which is taken as given in the presented
set-up. However, IPR policies themselves can have an influence on the R&D effi-
ciency through their effect on knowledge spillovers via imitation and own R&D. The
evidence from East-Asian economies which used lax IPR policies to enable domestic
firms to imitate foreign technologies, suggests that imitation can be one source of
knowledge transfer from North to South, and therefore create a base for original
R&D for countries at earlier stages of development (Kawaura and La Croix, 1995;
Kumar, 2003; Kim, 2001).
In chapter 3, "The Dual Role of Intellectual Property Rights under Imitation and
Innovation Driven Development",2 I explore this interaction between imitation and
innovation by accounting for the endogeneity of the southern R&D development.
In particular, I model two channels benefiting the R&D development in the South:
The adaption of northern technologies through imitation and the creation of R&D
efficiency via own research activities. While chapter 2 focuses on the incentives IPRs
set by reducing the risk of imitation, chapter 3 thus additionally takes the effects of
IPRs on knowledge spillovers from North to South into account.
For southern countries with high research costs, the model yields multiple equilibria
associated with a different emphasis on original R&D and imitation. The innovation
equilibrium is characterized by high product variety and welfare in both regions,
2 This chapter is based in the paper "The Dual Role of Intellectual Property Rights under
Imitation and Innovation Driven Development", Newiak (2011).
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and by an efficient southern research sector which achieves its productivity via own
innovative efforts. If the South raises IPRs for northern innovations in this case,
it shifts southern resources away from imitation to own research activity. As the
spillovers from imitation are only a minor source of knowledge accumulation at this
stage of development, the increase in IPRs spurs the incentives to conduct R&D
and raises welfare in both regions. In the imitation equilibrium, the South’s main
source of learning is the adaption of knowledge from the North through imitation,
and its research efficiency is low. If northern goods are protected more strongly
in the South at this stage of development, they dampen R&D incentives as they
decrease the R&D efficiency by making the main source of learning less accessible.
As a result, IPRs affect welfare and southern innovation negatively.
The results from chapters 2 and 3 thus suggest, that while the protection of domestic
R&D in developing countries is never associated with negative welfare, growth and
R&D effects, an increase in the protection of developed countries’ innovations in the
developing region is only beneficial if the research sector in the South is already
present (chapter 2) and sufficiently large and developed (chapter 3).
While intellectual property rights (IPRs) are one of the key drivers of economic
performance and welfare in R&D based growth models (Romer, 1990; Eicher and
García-Peñalosa, 2008), they are largely neglected as development determinants in
cross-country regressions in the empirical literature. In chapter 4 of this disserta-
tion, "Intellectual Property Rights as Development Determinants"3, we follow the
canonical development determinant approach of Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu
et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004), and introduce Intellectual Property Rights as
an additional candidate regressor into a well established line of development regres-
sions. In particular, we obtain differentiated protection measures by disaggregating
the patent index by Park (2008a)/Ginarte and Park (1997) and test them, together
3 This chapter is based on the paper "Intellectual Property Rights as Development Determi-
nants", Eicher and Newiak (2011).
4
with a set of candidate regressor proposed in previous studies, for their relevance in
explaining income levels across countries. We use Two-Stage Least Squares Bayesian
Model Averaging (2SBMA) proposed by Lenkoski et al. (forthcoming) to address en-
dogeneity issues and account for model uncertainty at both the income determinant
and instrument level. The impact of intellectual property rights enforcement on
development is shown to be of the same magnitude as that of "rule of law", the
key regressor in cross-country development regressions in the current literature. We
thus show that (1) both dimensions of property rights, physical and intellectual,
are crucial prerequisites for a country’s development, and that (2) IPRs which are
simply "on the books", but are not enforced cannot explain development.
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Chapter 2
Imitation and Innovation Driven
Development under Imperfect
Intellectual Property Rights∗
2.1 Introduction
The distribution of R&D efforts between developed and developing countries is
changing. In its Science, Technology and Industry Outlook, the OECD (2008) re-
ports that the distribution of Gross domestic expenditures on R&D (GERD) shifts
towards non-OECD countries whose share in global R&D increased from less than
12% to over 18% from 1996 to 2005. A similar pattern arises for business R&D
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Christian Lorenczik. I would like to thank Theo
Eicher, Matthias Doepke, Gerhard Illing, Niloy Bose, Monika Piazzesi, Martin Schneider,
Michele Tertilt, Philip Brock, Oksana Leukhina and Stephen Turnovsky for many helpful
comments and suggestions. The chapter has also greatly benefited from the comments and
suggestions by various conference participants at the European Economic Association meeting
in Oslo, the Midwest International Trade Meeting in Madison, the DEGIT XV conference in
Frankfurt, the European Workshop in Macroeconomics in Munich, the Warsaw International
Economics Meeting, the Midwest Economic Association Meeting in St. Louis, the Southwest-
ern Society of Economists meeting in Houston and the third PhD conference in Economics in
Athens. I would also like to thank the seminar participants at the University of Munich and
the University of Washington, Seattle, for their valuable comments.
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expenditures of profit-oriented enterprises. In China, South Africa, Russia and In-
dia, the ratios of R&D expenditure to GDP exceed those of high income countries
like Greece and Portugal. UIS (2009)4 reports an even higher share of developing
countries in world R&D for 2007: developing countries accounted for almost 24%
of world GERD and employed almost 38% of world researchers. The extent of in-
vestments into R&D is closely correlated with the level of domestic IPR protection.
Figure 2.1 plots the Gross expenditures on R&D and GDP per capita against the
Ginarte and Park patent index in 2005.5
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Figure 2.1: R&D expenditures (GERD), IPRs, and GDP per capita
For the group of countries associated with low levels of IPRs (below an index of
about 3 to 3.5), R&D expenditures are below 1% with low variations. Above the
threshold, there is a clear positive correlation between R&D efforts, the level of IPRs
and GDP per capita.6 Not only do the graphs show that there is a threshold level
of IPRs which has to be reached for IPRs to be positively associated with R&D,
4 The UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
5 Data sources: R&D expenditures for 2007 from UIS (2009), IPR index for 2005 from Park
(2008a), GDP per capita for 2007 and country codes are from United Nations Statistics
Division: National Accounts. We thank Walter Park for sharing the data on the patent index.
6 For earlier periods, i.e. before TRIPS was established, the plot looks qualitatively similar,
but the data are somewhat shifted to the left, i.e. to lower levels of IPRs. See Park (2008a)
for the sources of changes in the index. The same observation is made in Ginarte and Park
(1997) who find that high income countries provide the highest level of IPR protection.
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but also that IPR protection is positively related to income in a country only if it
supports a sufficiently developed R&D sector.7
The division of countries into industrialized innovating countries (the North) and
imitating developing countries (the South) in the theoretical literature does not
account for the increasing investments into R&D in developing economies shown by
these recent surveys8 and does not allow for scenarios of a transition of imitator
countries to successful innovators as demonstrated by Asian Growth miracles like
South Korea, Taiwan and earlier Japan.
In this chapter, we develop a North-South increasing variety model which allows for
original innovation in both the North and the South, and also for the imitation of
both northern and southern inventions. We show that our model can explain the
IPR-R&D threshold level shown in figure 2.1, and determine the conditions under
which IPRs can stimulate southern innovative activity and increase welfare. We
then use the model to analyze the effects of different IPR policies in the South. For
the policy analysis the aspect of southern firms being also subject to imitation has
two main advantages: First, it allows us to analyze the effects of stronger IPRs on
southern R&D incentives directly. Second, we can thus examine the effects of IPRs
protecting northern or southern goods separately.
While international treaties such as the Paris and Berne Conventions prescribe the
national treatment principle, i.e. equally strong protection for domestic and for-
eign innovations, this principle might not be followed by developing countries. For
7 That there is also a threshold level also for IPRs and growth which is dependent on the level
of human capital in a country is shown by Mohtadi and Ruediger (2010) using a threshold
estimation technique.
8 Important contributions with this feature include Grossman and Helpman (1991a), Deardorff
(1992) and Helpman (1993) and more recently Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010). For a
criticism of the lack of southern R&D in North-South models see Park (2008b). For two
examples of models in which the South can innovate, but is not the subject of imitation itself,
see (Currie et al., 1999; Glass, 2010). For firms’ private incentives to protect their intellectual
property compare Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2008). For a countries decision to set the level
of IPRs in a game theoretic framework see Grossman and Lai (2004).
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instance, as Kumar (2003) describes for the case of Japan until the 1970s, IPR legis-
lation might be in place to unilaterally advance domestic technology adoption from
abroad. Thus the second contribution of this chapter is to analyze the effects of
discriminatory southern IPR policies on both regions.
We find that southern R&D takes place if IPRs surpass a critical threshold level.
This critical level is lower for higher southern research efficiency and a larger south-
ern population. This implies that large countries with efficient R&D sectors are
likely to engage in innovation even under weak IPR regimes. Likewise, to stimulate
an inefficient R&D sector in a small country, IPRs have to be very strong. In stim-
ulating southern R&D, the protection of northern and the protection of southern
innovations are shown to work as imperfect substitutes. If R&D takes place in the
South, strengthening IPRs for both regions’ innovators increases welfare in both
regions. In contrast, an increase in IPRs that does not surpass the threshold level
fails to stimulate R&D, increases the wage gap between the regions and decreases
real consumption in the South.
We show that a southern deviation from the national treatment principle (increas-
ing IPRs for domestic firms only), does not harm either region if southern R&D
does not take place, and it benefits both regions if southern R&D is conducted: By
increasing R&D incentives for southern firms, it shifts the southern attention away
from the imitation of northern goods.
The next section discusses the related literature, and section 2.3 describes the model.
In section 4, we describe the equilibrium, state the conditions under which southern
R&D takes place and analyze the effects of different IPR policies on innovative
and imitative activity and wages in the two regions. In section 5, the model is
calibrated to analyze the welfare and employment effects of stronger IPRs, and
section 6 concludes.
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2.2 Related literature
In this section, we compare our results to the conclusions drawn by papers which
are most closely related to our work. These papers are different from the seminal
North-South models by, i.a., Grossman and Helpman (1991a), Deardorff (1992) and
Helpman (1993) in that they do not focus on the conflict between the innovating
North and the imitating South, but are more concerned with the trade-off between
imitation and innovation within the South.
In Currie et al. (1999), the South has the options to imitate the North or innovate
with knowledge dissipating gradually from the North to the southern knowledge
base. While not treating the effects of changes in IPRs explicitly, Currie et al. (1999)
argue that subsidies to the imitation sector have qualitatively the same effects as a
loosening of IPRs. The following features distinguish our model from Currie et al.
and lead to partially different results: First, we analyze the problem in a semi-
endogenous framework to match the empirical observations of non-scale growth as
in Jones (1995). Thus policy changes do not imply long-run changes of the growth
rate in our model. Second, we include the empirical feature of decreasing returns to
R&D into the imitation and innovation processes. This allows the South to engage in
R&D even if the wage differences between the regions are large which is not possible
in Currie et al.’s framework, but empirically more plausible. Third, while changes
in subsidies to imitation do not have any welfare implications for the case in which
the South only imitates in Currie et al. (1999), we show that in this no-innovation
case, stronger IPRs for innovations of both regions decrease welfare, but can help
to stimulate R&D if they surpass a threshold level. Finally and most importantly,
we are able to analyze discriminatory IPR policies as we allow for southern goods
to be also subject to imitation. The protection of northern IPRs affects innovation
incentives for the South only indirectly by making the alternative (imitation) more
costly. In our model, general IPR protection has the direct benefit of increased
10
expected profits for southern innovators. We can thus show that IPRs exclusively
for southern goods benefit both regions if southern R&D is present: they increase
R&D profitability for the South and thus shift resources away from imitation of the
North.
Glass (2010) also analyzes imitation and innovation in the South, but focuses on
how imitation encourages R&D by providing the South with a sufficient knowledge
base. She builds a product-cycle model in which an exogenous fraction of industries
has to engage in imitation before being able to target the market for innovations
and analyzes subsidies to northern and southern R&D and imitation. IPRs are
not treated explicitly but indiscriminate subsidies to imitation and innovation are
considered instead. The result suggests that when imitation is a prerequisite to
southern innovation, undirected subsidies can increase the rate of innovation relative
to imitation. However, these policies do not have any implications for the wage rate
if the South innovates, and welfare changes are not considered in her paper. We
emphasize that the focus of this chapter is different from Glass (2010): While she
analyzes how imitation can serve as a stepping stone to innovation, this chapter
examines how the South’s choice between innovation and imitation is influenced by
different IPR policies.
Newiak (2011) analyzes how imitation can encourage R&D in countries whose inno-
vation sector is small compared to those in which the R&D sector is sufficiently large.
The results of her model suggest that the effect of IPR policies depend crucially on
the state of the R&D sector’s development and the main channel of knowledge ac-
cumulation in the country. The model does not allow for imitation of southern
products so that IPR policies considered in the two papers are different: while in
Newiak (2011) an increase in IPRs always means that one source of knowledge is
harder to access, we reveal a channel through which stronger IPRs are never harmful
11
to R&D and welfare in the South while they can also benefit the North: stronger
IPRs for southern innovations.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Basic set-up of the model
Two regions interact in our model, a group of developed countries (the North) and
a group of developing countries (the South). Firms in North and South hire labor
for the production of consumption goods and for innovative and imitative research
and development (R&D). Labor is perfectly mobile within all sectors across one
region, but immobile between the two regions. Thus a single wage rate is paid to
all workers within one region. Trade between the two regions is costless. North
and South differ in their R&D activities. The North engages in innovation only. As
long as a northern variety has not been imitated, its production takes place in the
North, and the innovating firm charges the monopoly price on the global market.
Once a northern variety has been imitated by the South, its production shifts to the
South. The South engages in innovation and the imitation of both northern and
southern inventions. If a southern variety has been imitated, its production stays in
the South, but it is produced at lower costs by southern imitators.
2.3.2 Households
Each region is inhabited by a fixed measure of households whose size grows expo-
nentially at a constant rate gL. Each member of a household is endowed with one
unit of labor which he supplies inelastically to the labor market. So the labor supply
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in North and South at time t is given by `∗t = `∗0egLt and `t = `0egLt, respectively.9
Households in the two regions are identical concerning their preferences and sym-
metric in their maximization problem. We restrict the outline of the household’s
problem to the South in the following. Agents in the South maximize the discounted
lifetime flow of utility
U(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ−gL)t ln u(t)dt, u(t) =
[∫ Nt
0
xαj,tdj
] 1
α
(2.1)
arising from the consumption of Nt differentiated varieties in each period. ρ > gL is
the rate of time preference. xj,t denotes the per capita quantity demanded of variety
j, and α is the degree of product differentiation so that the elasticity of substitution
between varieties is ε = 11−α . Individuals are constrained by their wage and asset
income: a˙t = (rt − gL)at + wt − et in which et stands for consumption expenditure,
wt represents the wage income and rt is the interest rate paid on asset holdings at.
Solving the consumer’s maximization problem for both regions we obtain x¯j,t, the
average per capita demand for variety j by the world consumer at time t:
x¯j,t =
e¯t
Pt
(
pj,t
Pt
)−ε
(2.2)
in which e¯t represents average consumption expenditures per consumer defined as
e¯t = (e∗t `∗t + et`t)/Lt, pj,t is the price of variety j and Lt = `t + `∗t . The aggregate
price index is defined as Pt =
[∫Nt
0 p
1−ε
j,t dj
] 1
1−ε . Expenditures in the South grow at
e˙t
et
= rt− ρ such that individual consumption expenditures et grow over time only if
the market interest rate rt exceeds the discount rate ρ.
9 Throughout this dissertation the convention is used to indicate quantities referring to the
North by ’∗’ and to use no superscript for quantities of the South.
13
2.3.3 Research and Development
2.3.3.1 Innovation
Varieties are invented in the North and in the South. The total amount of varieties
invented in the North is given by n∗t = n∗R,t+nCN ,t in which n∗R,t and nCN ,t represent
the number of not imitated and imitated varieties, respectively. Similarly, nt =
nR,t + nCS ,t is the total number of varieties invented in the South with nR,t not
yet imitated and nCS ,t already imitated innovations. The total number of varieties
available to the world consumer is then given by:10
N = n∗ + n = n∗R + nCN + nR + nCS . (2.3)
To produce a new variety, R&D firms in the North and South have to develop an
innovation blueprint. To obtain this innovation blueprint they hire researchers `∗R
and `R. The employed researchers’ productivity depends on the available amount of
knowledge capital which we model as a function of the number of already existing
varieties: N θ. We assume that it is available to both regions equally, but that the
regions differ in how efficiently they use it:
n˙∗ = n˙∗R + n˙CN =
`∗RN
θ
ag
(2.4a)
n˙ = n˙R + n˙CS =
`RN
θ
agβ
, β > 1, 0 < θ < 1, g = N˙
N
. (2.4b)
We follow Jones (1995) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) in setting 0 < θ < 1
such that the R&D difficulty is decreasing in the number of blueprints, intertemporal
knowledge spillovers become weaker over time and strong scale effects are ruled out.
The parameter a captures the difficulty to innovate in the North so that β > 1 means
10 To simplify the notation we drop time scripts whenever no risk of ambiguity arises.
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that the South is relatively less productive in the innovation process. Further we
account for decreasing returns to innovation by letting the global variety growth
rate g = N˙
N
enter the innovation functions in the denominator.11
2.3.3.2 Imitation
Imitation takes place in the South only. In order to obtain the imitation blueprint
of a northern or southern innovation, imitation firms hire labor `CN and `CS and
use the existing knowledge capital N θ. In modelling imitation as a costly process
we follow the study by Mansfield et al. (1981) who find average imitation costs of
about 65% and an imitation time requirement of 70% compared to innovation. So
the imitation functions for northern and southern products are described as:
n˙CN =
`CNN
θ
φNdaιN
, ιN =
n˙CN
n∗R
(2.5a)
n˙CS =
`CSN
θ
φSaιS
, ιS =
n˙CS
nR
. (2.5b)
φN and φS capture the difficulty of imitating northern and southern varieties and are
interpreted as the strength of IPR protection in the South. The higher φN and φS,
the stronger the level of IPR protection and the higher the costs of imitation. Note
that we allow for different IPR levels for the inventions from the two regions, so that
the South is allowed to discriminate between domestic and foreign firms. ιN and ιS
are the imitation rates of northern and southern varieties which enter the imitation
functions as in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011), but with an elasticity of imita-
tion supply of one. Including the imitation rates in the imitation functions again
11 The growth rate g in the denominator captures decreasing returns to innovation as fol-
lows: The total number of varieties invented in period t by both regions is N˙t = `
∗
RN
θ
ag +
`RN
θ
agβ =
Nθt
ag (`∗R + `R/β). Given the definition of g, this expression can be rewritten as
N˙t =
(
N1+θt
a (`∗R + `R/β)
)1/2
which implies decreasing returns to innovation. For literature
on decreasing returns to innovation, compare Griliches et al. (1989) and Kortum (1993).
15
captures the idea of decreasing returns to R&D12. Finally, we introduce a distance
parameter d to allow for a higher imitation difficulty for northern varieties (due to
the remote original development and production and possibly higher technological
sophistication).
As they operate in the same region as the innovator, imitators of southern goods do
not have a labor cost advantage. In order to generate positive profits from imitation,
they hire process innovators who improve the production process such that the
imitating firm can produce the variety cheaper than the innovation firm. The cost
advantage in production η is a positive function of the amount of process innovators
`P employed and a negative function of the cost of developing the imitation blueprint:
If it is difficult to copy the technology in the first place, improving the production
process should be also more difficult. So η is modeled as a negative function of the
labor input `CS needed to develop the imitation blueprint: η = η¯
(
`P
`P+`CS
) 1
γ
with
η ∈ [0, η¯), implying an upper bound for the cost reduction and γ as the difficulty to
improve the production process.
2.3.4 Production
Labor is the only factor of production. For northern and southern innovators, one
unit of labor produces one unit of output. As long as the invention has not been
imitated, innovators have monopoly power and maximize their profit pi(∗)R = (p
(∗)
R −
w
(∗)
t )x¯
(∗)
R L subject to the demand function (2.2). Monopolists in the North and
South charge a constant mark-up over their marginal costs w∗ and w, such that
12 Compare footnote 11.
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prices and profits for northern and southern innovation firms are given by:
p∗R =
w∗
α
, pi∗R =
1− α
α
w∗x¯∗RL (2.6a)
pR =
w
α
, piR =
1− α
α
wx¯RL. (2.6b)
In the case of imitation, imitators and innovators compete in prices which drives
the price down to the innovator’s marginal cost of production and the innovating
firm shuts down. If the wage differential is not too high (w∗ ≤ w/α), the southern
imitator charges a price equal to the northern wage rate w∗ to force the northern
innovator out of the market. If the wage gap is high (w/α ≤ w∗), the imitator
can charge the monopoly price.13 As none of our results depends qualitatively on
whether narrow or wide gap case is present, we present the model for the wide gap
case in the following and outline how the model changes for the narrow-gap case in
appendix A. Due to the process innovation described in the previous section, an
imitator of southern innovations produces goods at lower marginal costs (1 − η)w.
We assume an upper bound on this cost advantage (η ≤ 1−α) so that the imitator
charges a price equal to the southern wage rate. The price and the profits for
imitated northern and southern goods are given by:
pCN =
w
α
, piCN =
1− α
α
wx¯CNL, w
∗ ≥ w
α
(2.7a)
pCS = w, piCS = ηwx¯CSL, η ≤ 1− α. (2.7b)
13 These cases are referred to as the narrow-gap case and the wide-gap case by Grossman and
Helpman (1991a).
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2.3.5 Financial sectors
The value of an innovating or imitating firm vR or vC is given by its expected
discounted profits. As there is free entry to R&D and imitation, these expected dis-
counted profits have to be equal to the cost of the respective activity. For innovating
firms, the cost consists of the wage paid to the researchers. For imitating firms, it
is the wage paid to the reverse engineers (and process innovators for imitators of
southern varieties). Using (2.4) and (2.5) to determine the amount of labor for these
activities, the firm values for innovators in North and South and imitators in the
South are:
v∗R =
w∗ag
N θ
(2.8a)
vR =
wβag
N θ
(2.8b)
vCN =
wφNaιN
N θ
(2.8c)
vCS =
wφSaιS
N θ(1− (η/η¯)γ) (2.8d)
There is perfect capital mobility between innovation, imitation and production sec-
tors within one region, but financial autarky in North and South. Agents in the
North can decide between holding the market portfolio with a safe return r∗ or
shares of the northern innovation firms which pay a return pi∗R/v∗R. This return has
to be adjusted by the change in the value of the firm v˙∗R/v∗R and the risk of being
copied n˙CN/n∗R. In the South, agents have the choice between gaining the risk free
rate r and holding shares of southern innovation or imitation firms. No-arbitrage
between these choices within North and South implies:
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pi∗R
v∗R
+ v˙
∗
R
v∗R
− n˙CN
n∗R
= r∗ (2.9a)
piR
vR
+ v˙R
vR
− n˙CS
nR
= r = piCN
vCN
+ v˙CN
vCN
= piCS
vCS
+ v˙CS
vCS
. (2.9b)
2.3.6 Labor markets
Finally, labor market clearing in the North and South requires that the sum of
workers employed in the R&D and production sectors equals the total labor force in
each region. In the North, labor is allocated into R&D and production: `∗ = `∗R+`∗Y .
In the South, labor is allocated into R&D, the imitation of northern goods, the
imitation of southern goods, process innovation and production: ` = `R + `CN +
(`CS + `P ) + `Y which, using the innovation and imitation functions (2.4) and (2.5)
implies the following two labor market clearing conditions:
`∗ = ag
Nθ
(n˙∗R + n˙CN ) + n∗Rx¯∗RL (2.10a)
` = agβ
Nθ
(n˙R + n˙CS ) +
adφN ιN
Nθ
n˙CN +
aφSιS
Nθ(1− (η/η¯)γ) n˙CS
+ (nRx¯R + nCN x¯CN + (1− η)nCS x¯CS )L. (2.10b)
2.4 The balanced growth path and the effects of
intellectual property rights
In this section, we define the equilibrium and analyze the conditions under which
innovation takes place in the South. We then analyze the effect of different IPR
policies for an equilibrium with southern innovation. The model without southern
innovation is described in appendix B.
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2.4.1 Definition of the equilibrium and long-run growth
The equilibrium is given by a set of prices, wages and interest rates in North and
South such that the allocation of labor into the different sectors, varieties and their
supply, consumption expenditures and asset holdings (1) solves the households’ util-
ity maximization problem and firms’ profit maximization problem and (2) labor,
goods and financial markets clear given the free market entry of firms. In this
steady state equilibrium, variety growth g ≡ N˙/N , the South-North wage ratio
ω ≡ w/w∗, the imitation rates ιN and ιS, the optimal cost advantage of southern
imitative production η?, the variety shares ξ∗R ≡ n∗R/N , ξR ≡ nR/N , ξCN ≡ nCN/N
and ξCS ≡ nCS/N = 1 − ξ∗R − ξR − ξCN , and the shares of labor employed in the
different sectors of each region are constant. Further, constant consumption expen-
ditures imply that the risk-free interest rates in North and South are equal to the
rate of time preference ρ = r∗ = r.
As the variety shares are constant in equilibrium, the number of varieties of each kind
has to grow at the same rate g = N˙/N = n˙∗R/n∗R = n˙R/nR = n˙CN/nCN = n˙CS/nCS .
Dividing (2.4) by N and using the fact that the R&D employment ratio `∗R/`∗ is
constant in steady state the equilibrium growth rate is determined as
g = gL1− θ . (2.11)
The growth rate is finite and positive for θ < 1. This semi-endogenous growth
implies that policy actions do not have any effect on the long-run growth rate.
2.4.2 The threshold to innovation in the South
We turn now to answering the first question of this chapter: Which factors determine
the innovation threshold observed in the data (compare figure 2.1)? To answer
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this question, we consider the conditions under which innovation and imitation are
beneficial in the two regions: Rearranging the no-arbitrage conditions with respect
to the firm values and equating with (2.8) and realizing that v˙∗R/v∗R = v˙R/vR =
v˙CN/vCN = v˙CS/vCS = −θg, we arrive at four conditions balancing profits and costs
of innovative and imitative activities in North and South:
pi∗R
ρ+ θg + ιN
= w
∗ag
N θ
(2.12a)
piR
ρ+ θg + ιS
= wβag
N θ
(2.12b)
piCN
ρ+ θg =
wφNdaιN
N θ
(2.12c)
piCS
ρ+ θg =
wφSaιS
N θ(1− (η/η¯)γ) . (2.12d)
The left-hand side of (2.12) represents the benefit (the appropriately discounted
profits) from innovation and imitation, whilst the right-hand side represents the
cost (wage payments) of the respective activity.14 These conditions are crucially
affected by the level of IPRs (φS and φN): first, they directly determine the cost of
imitation (the right-hand sides of (2.12c) and (2.12d)) and second, via their effect on
the imitation rates, they affect the expected profits from innovation (the left-hand
sides of equations (2.12a) and (2.12b)). As the South does only engage in R&D if
the expected profits and the associated costs from performing R&D are at least as
attractive as the imitation of northern varieties we thus expect three parameters to
crucially influence the existence of southern innovation: First, the higher the relative
research inefficiency β the higher the cost of developing one blueprint and the higher
14 Note that the cost advantage in the production of southern products η is determined optimally
by the southern imitation firm. To set η optimally, the marginal revenue (the increase in profits
due to the decrease in the production costs) and the marginal cost of hiring a process innovator
(the wage rate) are equated. Thus, both sides of (2.12d) are differentiated with respect to `P .
The optimal cost advantage can then be written as η? = η¯
(
1
1+γ
) 1
γ .
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the required profits to cover these costs. Second, expected profits to R&D depend
negatively on the risk of being imitated ιS which is directly determined by the level
of IPRs for southern innovations φS (which we explicitly show in the next section).
Third, the decision to engage in R&D depends on the ease of imitation of northern
goods which is influenced by the protection of northern goods φN : the lower φN the
easier is imitation compared to innovation. Finally, the southern decisions have to
be consistent with the southern resource constraint (labor market clearing).
Combining the southern cost-benefit conditions (2.12b)-(2.12d) with the southern
labor market clearing equation, we obtain the condition under which employment
in the southern innovation sector is positive:
`
`∗
> dφN
(
ιN
g
)2 ( Λ1
Λ1 + ιN
)
, ιN =
β
dφN
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)g
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)− η?βg (2.13)
with Λ1 = (1−α)g+α(ρ+θg). From (2.13) follows that the higher the protection of
northern or southern innovations (the higher φS and φN) the more likely the South
engages in research. Intuitively, the South is, c.p., more likely to engage in R&D if
its research efficiency is high (β is low). For a given southern R&D efficiency, IPRs
for northern and southern IPRs are substitutes to a certain degree: If φN is high
and therefore the costs of imitating the North are high compared to conducting own
research, expected profits from R&D can be smaller and therefore IPRs for southern
goods can be weaker. Further, the higher the cost of original research in the South
(the higher β) the stronger IPRs have to be for northern and southern products
in order to make R&D comparatively profitable. Finally, the existence of southern
R&D is more likely if the southern labor force is large. This implies that for given
levels of IPR protection and research ability, large countries are more likely to engage
in innovation. We plot the IPR threshold (`R = 0) in figure 2.2 for illustration.
Innovation takes place for all combinations of φS and φN on the right-hand side of
the isoquant. The figure demonstrates that the South can go from a phase of solely
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Figure 2.2: IPR threshold for southern research employment.
imitating the North to a phase with own original R&D if the southern research
efficiency or IPRs are sufficiently increased. It also reveals that in order to stimulate
R&D in countries with a less efficient research sector IPR protection has to be
stronger than in countries with efficient R&D sectors. The results are summarized
in
Proposition 1 (i) Stronger IPRs can stimulate southern innovation if they surpass
a threshold level. (ii) This threshold level is higher the less efficient the southern
research sector and the smaller the relative size of the southern population. (iii)
The protection of southern and northern innovations work as imperfect substitutes
in encouraging southern R&D.
If (2.13) is not satisfied, the cost-benefit conditions (2.12b) and (2.12d) do not
apply and the model collapses to the standard North-South model without southern
innovation. While we focus on the case in which southern R&D takes place in the
following, we describe the no-innovation case in appendix B.
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2.4.3 Intellectual property rights policy effects on the in-
centives to innovate and imitate
To obtain the rates at which northern and southern products are imitated, we com-
bine the cost-benefit conditions (2.12b) and (2.12d) as well as (2.12a) with (2.12d),
substitute for the profits and use the demands for varieties (2.2):
ιS =
η?β(ρ+ θg)g
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)− η?βg (2.14a)
ιN =
β
dφN
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)g
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)− η?βg , (2.14b)
with ∆1 = (1 − α)αε−1 (1+γ)γ .15 Suppose first that the South follows the national
treatment principle and chooses to protect domestic and foreign goods equally (for-
mally: set φN = φS = φ ). Increasing φ will then decrease the rates at which
domestic and foreign goods are imitated. However, the South could also choose to
discriminate between domestic and foreign innovators by increasing only either φN
or φS. Increasing IPRs for northern firms will decrease the rate at which northern
firms are imitated, but leave the risk of being imitated for southern innovators un-
affected. In contrast, if the South chooses to increase IPRs for domestic innovations
only (φS ↑), both rates of imitation decrease. This effect results from the impact
of φS on southern innovation: If southern goods are better protected, southern in-
novators face a lower risk of being imitated and consequently their expected profits
increase. This makes own innovation more attractive compared to the imitation of
both northern and southern goods which leads to the decline of the imitation rates.
In line with this reasoning, policies which aim at increasing the southern research
efficiency (decreasing β) decrease the imitation rates by decreasing the innovation
costs and thus making southern innovation more attractive compared to imitation.
15 As ιS has to be non-negative, the parameters of the model are constrained to η?βg < φS∆1(ρ+
θg).
24
Proposition 2 In an equilibrium with southern innovation, the rates at which north-
ern and southern innovations are imitated are decreasing in (i) an increase in IPRs
for all varieties, (ii) an increase in IPRs exclusively for southern innovations and
(iii) an increase in the southern research efficiency. Increases in IPRs exclusively for
northern goods decrease the imitation risk for northern goods, but leave the imitation
rate for southern innovations unaffected.
How do these changes of imitation risks relate to the allocation of labor into the
different sectors in North and South? We use the northern labor market clearing
condition and combine it with the cost-benefit conditions to get the amount of labor
allocated into R&D and production in the North:
`∗R =
(1− α)(g + ιN)
Λ1 + ιN
`∗ (2.15a)
`∗Y =
α(ρ+ θg + ιN)
Λ1 + ιN
`∗. (2.15b)
The amount of labor employed in the northern R&D sector is increasing in the
rate at which northern products are copied: If northern innovations are copied at a
high rate, the production of northern inventions shifts to the South quickly. As a
consequence, labor is set free from the production sector to the innovation sector.
It follows that policies which decrease the imitation risks for northern firms (φN ↑
or φS ↑ or β ↓), also decrease the share of labor employed in the northern research
sector.
To obtain the allocation of southern labor into the imitation of northern goods, we
combine (2.15) with the imitation function for northern goods:
`CN =
φN ι
2
N
g
(1− α)
(Λ1 + ιN)
`∗. (2.16)
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Using (2.14b), we can show that employment in the imitation sector for northern
goods is decreasing in the strength of IPR protection for northern and southern
goods φN and φS and increasing in the southern research inefficiency β. The higher
the protection of northern goods φN , the costlier the imitation of northern goods, so
that southern innovation and imitation of southern goods become more attractive.
The higher the protection of southern goods φS, the smaller the risk of being copied
for the South, the more attractive is southern research which shifts resources from
the imitation of northern goods to own innovation. This result again reveals that
an IPR policy in favor of domestic innovators (increase φS only) can shift resources
away from the imitation of foreign innovations.
To obtain the number of workers employed in the southern innovation sector, we
use (2.16) and the cost-benefit conditions (2.12b)-(2.12d) :
`R =
`− φN
(
ιN
g
)2 ( Λ1
Λ1 + ιN
)
`∗
 (1− α)(g + ιS)
Λ1 + ιS + 1−αη?
γ+1
γ
φS
β
(
ιs
g
)2
Λ2
, (2.17)
in which Λ2 = η?g + (1 − η?)(ρ + θg). Equation (2.17) consists of two terms. The
number of workers which are not employed in the imitation of northern products
and their production is given by the first factor. The second factor gives the fraction
of these workers employed in original southern R&D. Southern R&D employment is
increasing in the level at which northern and southern inventions are protected (φN
and φS).16 When protecting northern goods more strongly, imitation of these goods
becomes more costly and thus becomes relatively unattractive compared to innova-
tion, thus R&D employment increases. When protecting southern inventions more
strongly, R&D employment increases for two reasons: First, imitation of southern
products becomes more costly and therefore relatively less attractive compared to
R&D. Second, southern R&D becomes more attractive as the risk of being imitated
declines. We summarize these findings in the following proposition:
16 A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the latter statement is that φS < 2∆1(ρ+θg) .
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Proposition 3 An increase in the level of IPRs for northern or southern goods or
an increase in the efficiency of the southern research sector (i) increases employment
in the southern research sector, (ii) decreases employment in the northern research
sector and (iii) decreases employment in the imitation sector which targets northern
goods.
The effects of IPR policies on the labor allocated to the imitation of southern in-
ventions `CS = φSιSgβ
ιS
ιS+g `R is explored in the numerical part (section 2.5).
2.4.4 Policy effects of stronger Intellectual Property Rights
on wages and welfare
After analyzing how IPRs influence the southern incentives to innovate and imitate,
we now look at whether these changes in incentives and labor allocation are beneficial
to either of the regions. First, we look at the response of the wage differential
between the two regions as a measure of their difference in development. Second, we
outline the way we are going to measure changes in welfare due to IPR changes which
will be quantified in the numerical section. Combining the cost-benefit conditions
(2.12a) and (2.12b) with the equations for the imitation rates, we determine the
relative wage between South and North w
w∗ :
ω =
(
1
β
+ 1
dφN(ρ+ θg)
− η
?
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)
) 1
ε
. (2.18)
The relative wage between South and North is determined by the southern research
inefficiency (β) and the IPRs for northern and southern goods (φN and φS). Intu-
itively, the more efficient the southern research sector compared to the northern one
(the lower β), the lower the wage differential between the regions. The equilibrium
wage reveals that the protection of northern and southern goods have different effects
on how far the South is behind in terms of wages: Stronger protection of northern
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goods increases the wage gap, stronger protection for domestic innovators decreases
the wage gap. While both IPR policies increase the cost of imitation, stronger pro-
tection for southern goods also raises the profitability of southern R&D and thus
southern wages. Suppose again, that the South follows the national treatment prin-
ciple and protects northern and southern innovations equally strong (φN = φS = φ).
Then differentiating (2.18) with respect to φ gives the following condition:
∂ω
∂φ
≷ 0 if ιS ≷ ιN . (2.19)
This condition says that stronger IPRs increase the southern wage rate relative to
the northern one if southern products are imitated at a higher rate, but decreases
it if northern products are subject to higher imitation. For the national treatment
case ιS > ιN is fulfilled if d > ∆1η? . This says that stronger IPRs decrease the wage
difference between the regions only if northern products are sufficiently difficult to
imitate.
Proposition 4 In an equilibrium with southern innovation, an increase in IPRs
for southern innovations decreases the wage gap between South and North, while
stronger IPRs for northern goods increase the wage gap. A simultaneous increase
in IPRs for northern and southern goods decreases the wage differential between the
regions only if northern innovations are sufficiently difficult to imitate.
Finally, in order to make welfare predictions for IPR policy changes, we solve for as-
set holdings, consumer expenditures and the economic growth rate. The aggregate
value of northern assets A∗ is the product of the number of non-copied northern
innovations and the value of a northern innovation firm A∗ = n∗Rv∗R. Substituting
v∗R by (2.8) yields A∗ = ξ∗Rw∗agN1−θ. The southern aggregate asset value A consists
of the sum of the values of the assets from innovating and the two kinds of imitating
firms, so that it is given by A =
(
ξRgβ + ξCNφN ιN + ξCS 1+γγ φSιS
)
awN1−θ. It fol-
lows that per capita asset holdings in the North a∗ = A∗/`∗ and the South a = A/`
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are constant in equilibrium. We can then use the budget constraint of the repre-
sentative consumer to determine the per capita consumption expenditure levels e∗
and e as functions of the variety shares and wage rates. The aggregate price level is
given by Pt = N1/(1−ε)t (ξ∗R(p∗R)1−ε + ξR(pR)1−ε + ξCN (pCN )1−ε + ξCS(pCS)1−ε)
1/(1−ε).
Let c∗t ≡ e∗t/Pt and ct ≡ et/Pt denote real consumption expenditure in North and
South. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), this measure also represents consumers’
utility at time t; we thus have c(∗)t = u
(∗)
t . We solve for the equilibrium utilities of
North and South using (2.1):
u∗t =
e∗t
Pt
≡ c∗t , ut =
et
Pt
≡ ct. (2.20)
As nominal per capita consumption expenditure e(∗) is constant in steady state, but
the aggregate price level Pt is decreasing over time, utility is growing over time. As
utility is proportional to consumption expenditure when prices are held fixed it can
be interpreted as real consumption growth. Thus the growth rate of the utility can
be interpreted as economic growth. Real consumption growth in this model is given
by u˙∗/u∗ = u˙/u = c˙∗/c∗ = c˙/c = g/(ε − 1) ≡ gc > 0. As the steady state growth
rate of real consumption in both regions is equal and independent of the policy
parameters, a long-run welfare analysis of changes in the parameters of interest on
welfare can be simplified to looking at changes in c∗0 and c0.17 As the changes in
c∗0 and c0 due to changes in IPRs are ambiguous, we leave the analysis of welfare
changes in response to stronger IPR protection and different development stages of
the southern research sector for the numerical analysis in this chapter.
17 This approach has been taken by Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011).
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2.5 Numerical analysis
2.5.1 Calibration of the model
Providing analytical results for the effects of chances in IPR protection on certain
economic outcomes proved to be unfeasible in the previous section. In this section,
to analyze the effects of changes in IPR protection on real consumption levels in
both regions and the allocation of labor into the imitation of southern innovations,
we calibrate the model with empirically sound parameters. The main aim of this
section is not to get reliable quantitative predictions of the effects of stronger IPRs,
but mainly to provide a qualitative idea about their effects on welfare, as measured
in real consumption, in both regions.
To calibrate the model, parameters are set to match the following target moments18:
The real interest rate takes a value of 7% according to the average real US stock
market return over the past century estimated by Mehra and Prescott (1985). This
implies a subjective discount rate ρ of the same value. Basu (1996) and Norrbin
(1993) estimate a markup of 40% over marginal costs, determining the degree of
differentiation between varieties α to be 0.714. The population growth rate gL =
0.0168 represents the average annual world population growth rate of 1.68% between
1960-2008 reported by the World Bank World Development Indicators 2009 (World
Bank, 2009). Only the ratio of population size, `0/`∗0, is relevant for the steady state
equilibrium. Comparing population in middle-income to high-income coutries, this
ratio is given by approximately 4.35, including low-income countries in the southern
population, the ratio is about 5.27 for 2008 figures (World Bank, 2009). Due to
our general notion of the South we include low-income countries and use a value of
`0/`
∗
0 = 5.27. To achieve a utility growth rate gc of about 2%, reflecting the average
18 For the sake of comparability, we calibrate the target moments as in Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2011) when applicable.
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US GDP per capita growth rate from 1950-1994 as reported in Jones (2005), we
set the value of intertemporal R&D spillovers θ = 0.67. Following Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2011), we aim for a cost advantage of imitators of the South of η? = 10%,
leading to a parameterization of η¯ = 0.18 and 1/γ = θ. As only the relative research
difficulty determines the steady state of the model, we set ag = 1 to normalize the
parameters. For the benchmark case, we assume a research inefficiency of the South
of β = 3, which implies a three times higher R&D labor requirement. The distance
parameter for imitation d is set to 10. Given those values, we set the parameters for
IPR protection to φN = φS = 1.5 which results in plausible imitation rates of about
2% of northern innovations and 9% of southern innovations.
2.5.2 Change of intellectual property rights protection for
northern and southern innovations
The first simulation shows the effects of a general change in IPR protection in the
South, i.e. when φN = φS = φ. The fourth column contains the benchmark case
with φ = 1.5 for which the South is active in original R&D (`R > 0) and the
wage differential is such that the wide-gap case applies (ω < α). For lower values
of φ up to the threshold value of about 1, no innovation takes place in the South
as R&D incentives are too weak given the ease of imitating the North. Table 2.1
shows that the South loses from the strengthening of IPR protection both in terms
of real consumption and relative wage until the innovation threshold is reached.
This is due to the detrimental effect of IPR protection for northern varieties. The
South relies on imitation of the North to obtain production blueprints. With higher
protection, imitation employment leads to fewer imitation blueprints. The lower
marginal productivity reduces wages and leads to an increase in production of each
variety as their prices decline. Overall, employment shares do not change in the
South up to the threshold. However, fewer varieties are produced in larger quantities
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for lower prices. Northern research declines slightly before and more noticeable after
the threshold is passed.
no innov. with innov.
IPR protection φS = φN 0.6 1 1.1 1.5 2.25
relative wage S/N ω 0.647 0.594 0.599 0.641 0.674
imitation rate N ιN 0.062 0.046 0.038 0.019 0.010
imitation rate S ιS 0 0 0.181 0.090 0.047
innov. labor N `∗R/`∗ 0.214 0.205 0.201 0.185 0.176
fraction innov. labor S `R/` 0 0 0.005 0.029 0.054
fracion labor imit. N `CN /` 0.164 0.164 0.134 0.053 0.023
fraction labor imit. S `aCS/` 0 0 0.008 0.027 0.030
real cons. N c∗0 6.028 5.989 6.222 7.488 8.865
real cons. S c0 4.148 3.743 3.825 4.609 5.621
rel. cons. N/S c∗0/c0 1.453 1.600 1.627 1.625 1.577
Notes: a sum of imitators of the South and process innovators.
Table 2.1: Changing IPR protection for northern and southern goods
Figure 2.3 shows the detailed development of research employment in the South and
real consumption. The change in the labor allocation in the South is comparable to
the case in which only the protection of southern innovations is improved. However,
the fall in imitation of the North is more pronounced as both IPR protection levels
contribute to a shift from imitation of the North to research in the South.
After an initially high imitation employment and therewith imitation rate of south-
ern innovations, both reduce as a consequence of better protection and increased
profitability of southern original R&D compared to imitation. Surprisingly, the
North does not benefit from an increase in the protection of its goods before the
threshold. This is due to the reduction of innovation on the one side, but more
importantly due to reduced supply of lower priced imitated goods on the other side.
Once the threshold is passed, both regions experience an increase in real consump-
tion with the South starting to catch up in relative consumption.
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Figure 2.3: Proportionate change of IPR protection.
2.5.3 Change of intellectual property rights protection for
southern innovations
The simulation in table 2.2 shows the change of key variables that result from changes
of the level of IPR protection for southern innovations φS only, i.e. a deviation from
the national treatment principle. As the northern IPR protection level is unchanged,
the threshold has slightly decreased to about φS = 0.95. For lower values of φS, no
innovation takes place in the South. As only southern IPR protection is varied,
changes up to the threshold level do not affect the equilibrium. Once the threshold
is passed, innovation in the South starts and new varieties developed in the South
attract imitation. Thus labor employed in the imitation of southern goods first
increases, but later declines steadily with the rise of IPR protection. At the same
time, northern products are less frequently imitated as southern resources are shifted
to innovation and imitation of the South. As more innovations stay in the North,
its R&D employment decreases slightly.
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no innov. with innov.
IPR S innov. φS 0.75 0.95 1 1.5 1.75
relative wage S/N ω 0.555 0.555 0.563 0.641 0.660
imitation rate N ιN 0.036 0.036 0.033 0.019 0.017
imitation rate S ιS 0 0 0.237 0.090 0.069
innov. labor N `∗R`∗ 0.199 0.199 0.197 0.185 0.183
fraction innov. labor S `R/` 0 0 0.002 0.029 0.038
fracion labor imit. N `CN /` 0.164 0.164 0.146 0.053 0.043
fraction labor imit. S `aCS/` 0 0 0.005 0.027 0.028
real cons. N c∗0 5.927 5.927 6.047 7.488 7.954
real cons. S c0 3.433 3.433 3.507 4.609 5.007
rel. cons. N/S c∗0/c0 1.726 1.726 1.724 1.625 1.589
Notes: a sum of imitators of the South and process innovators.
Table 2.2: Changing protection of southern goods
Figure 2.4 illustrates the development of southern research employment and real
consumption in greater detail. Up to the threshold level, indicated by the gray
vertical bar, changes in φS remain without effect. Concerning the labor employment
in the South, resources are quickly withdrawn from the imitation of the North once
the threshold is passed and shifted to southern innovation and imitation of the
South. While employment in imitating the South19 initially exceeds the research
employment, original research eventually becomes the largest research sector in the
South. Real consumption expenditure and therewith utility are positively affected
by increases in φS above the threshold level. The North benefits from higher returns
to innovation as well as more product varieties provided by the South which more
than compensates the higher fraction of goods supplied monopolistically. The same
holds for the South, which can catch up in relative consumption to the North.
19 Note that `CS includes both imitators and process innovators in the graphs.
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Figure 2.4: Change of protection of southern innovations.
2.5.4 Summary of main numerical results
The long-run consequences of a strengthening of IPRs for northern and southern
innovations in the South is welfare decreasing for the South and has negligible effects
for the North if the South does not engage in innovation. An increase in IPRs
exclusively for southern goods is shown to have no effect on any of the regions
welfare outcomes if it fails to pass the threshold level and thus fails to stimulate
R&D in the South. With southern innovation, stronger IPRs for both northern and
southern goods are related to higher welfare in both regions. Finally, a deviation of
the South from the national treatment principle by raising IPR standards exclusively
for domestic firms raises welfare in both regions by shifting the southern resources
away from imitation to original innovation.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter gives a theoretical explanation for the empirically observed threshold
level in the relationship between IPRs and innovative activity. To explain this
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relationship, we account for the increased R&D efforts by developing countries and
extend the previous literature to allow not only for southern R&D and imitation of
northern goods, but also for imitation of southern inventions. Further, to analyze
the effects of southern IPR policies deviating from the national treatment principle
(by raising IPRs for southern goods more strongly than for northern goods), we
allow for different degrees of IPR protection for northern and southern varieties.
We show that for low levels of IPRs and low research efficiency in the South, southern
R&D does not take place. The model therefore nests the results of "standard" North-
South models for the no-innovation case: If IPRs are strengthened in this stage of
southern development, they do not stimulate R&D and decrease wages and welfare
in the South. However, in accordance with the empirically observed patterns, we
show that if IPRs surpass a critical level, they help to spur innovation in the South
and increase welfare in both regions. The critical IPR level depends on the southern
R&D efficiency and labor resources such that large countries or countries with a high
research efficiency engage in R&D even under relatively weak protection. Likewise,
to stimulate an inefficient R&D sector in a small country, IPRs have to be very
strong.
We show that the protection of southern and northern innovations can work as
imperfect substitutes in encouraging southern R&D though they work via different
channels: While the protection of southern innovations affects expected profits from
R&D directly, stronger protection of northern goods achieves this effect mainly by
making the imitation of northern goods more expensive. Finally, we can show that
an increase of IPRs exclusively for southern goods does not harm any region in the
no-innovation case. However, if southern R&D takes place, such a policy benefits
both regions by increasing the southern innovation incentives and thus shifting its
resources away from the imitation of northern goods.
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Chapter 3
The Dual Role of Intellectual
Property Rights under Imitation
and Innovation Driven
Development∗
3.1 Introduction
For many former developing countries initial phases of high imitation and weak intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs) provided the possibility to adopt foreign technologies
and gain experience from reverse engineering. In Japan, weak intellectual property
protection was chosen as a policy instrument to facilitate the adoption of foreign
technologies in order to develop a domestic R&D sector: The exclusion of certain
products such as food, beverage and pharmaceutical products from patenting as well
∗ I would like to thank Theo Eicher, Matthias Doepke, Gerhard Illing and Christian Lorenczik
for many helpful comments and suggestions. This chapter has also greatly benefited from sev-
eral comments made by seminar participants at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich
and University of Washington, Seattle.
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as the application of utility models, compulsory licenses and the first-to-apply sys-
tem created a climate of weak protection for foreign innovators, but helped domestic
firms to acquire foreign knowledge through imitation (Kumar, 2003). Only in the
mid 1970s, when the research sector was sufficiently developed, product patents for
chemicals and pharmaceuticals were introduced (Kawaura and La Croix, 1995). To-
day, Japan is one of the world’s top innovators; it accounted for about 16% of world
gross expenditures on R&D (GERD) in 2008 (3.4% of Japan’s GDP) and its num-
ber of researchers per million inhabitants was as high as 5,573 in 2007 (UNESCO,
2010; OECD, 2010).20 Many developing and emerging countries have followed or
are currently following a path similar to the one demonstrated by Japan. Taiwan
and South Korea followed a similar path of maintaining a weak IPR system which
helped them to obtain relevant know-how through imitation (Kim, 2001; Kumar,
2003). South Korea targets a GERD share in GDP of 5% for 2012 and achieved
3.4% in 2008; it inhabited 4,627 researchers per million inhabitants in 2007 (OECD,
2010; UNESCO, 2010). Taiwan’s share of GERD in GDP was 2.6% in 2007 (OECD,
2009). Glass (2010) presents similar statistics obtained from the International Insti-
tute for Management Development (2009) and argues that trends similar to Japan’s
path can be observed increasingly also for China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
While imitation can be a "stepping stone to innovation" (Glass, 2010) at early stages
of development, the empirical evidence suggests that Intellectual Property Rights
(IPRs) are related to higher growth for countries in which the original research ac-
tivity is sufficiently high, i.e. a significantly sized research sector exists (Ginarte
and Park, 1997; Kim et al., 2011).21 Maskus (2000) finds a U-shaped relationship
20 These figures compare to 2.7% GERD in GDP and 4,707 researchers per million inhabitants
for the United States of America.
21 Ginarte and Park (1997) argue that the effects of IPRs on growth realize mainly through the
incentives they create for R&D, such that IPRs are positively related to growth for developed
countries, but do not have an effect on growth in developing countries in which the research
sectors’ sizes are insignificant. Kim et al. (2011) argue that patent rights enhance innovation
and growth in countries which have the capacity to innovate, but a system which protects
incremental innovations is more appropriate in countries in which this capacity is missing.
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between a country’s level of IPR protection and development, and Chen and Put-
titanun (2005) find that IPRs have a positive impact on innovation, but that a
country’s optimal level of IPRs depends on its level of development.
In this chapter, I propose a model of international trade between developed and
developing countries ("North" and "South") which is consistent with the above em-
pirical findings. To this end, I incorporate a southern R&D sector and a learning
channel into a standard North-South increasing variety model of non-scale growth.
In particular, I let the development of the southern research sector be endogenously
determined by the degree of innovative and imitative activity in the South.
The results suggest that for countries with research costs above a threshold level
multiple equilibria associated with different emphases on imitative and innovate ac-
tivities in the South can exist. I show that the same level of IPRs can be associated
with an either high or low level of development depending on the country’s R&D
specialization: In the innovation equilibrium, the welfare in the South is high, south-
ern firms efficiently invent a large number of varieties, northern firms face a low risk
of imitation, and the number of available varieties in the world is high. In contrast,
the imitation equilibrium is characterized by a southern focus on adopting northern
varieties, the southern research sector is less efficient, the welfare in the South is
low, and the number of available varieties on the world market is small.
Higher levels of IPRs are associated with larger differences between the equilibria:
In the innovation equilibrium, an increase in IPRs increases the incentives to con-
duct own R&D via two channels: First, it makes imitation more costly relative to
innovation. Second, by raising the research activity, it creates learning spillovers
from own R&D. These spillovers overcompensate the loss of spillovers from imita-
tion. Consequently, IPRs accompany higher R&D and welfare in that scenario. In
the imitation equilibrium, however, the loss in imitation spillovers is not compen-
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sated by the initial gain in R&D related knowledge, so that the cost of innovation
increases, the final effect on research is negative, and welfare is affected negatively.
The next section relates this chapter and its results to the literature. Section 3.3
presents the model which is solved in section 3.4. Section 3.5 then analyzes the
effects of stronger IPRs on innovation, imitation and research efficiency, and section
3.6 numerically analyzes the impact of IPRs on welfare. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
The model presented in this chapter is closely related to the literature which ana-
lyzes the trade-off between imitation and innovation in developing countries. Rather
than analyzing the conflicting interests between North and South in the protection
of intellectual property as done in the seminal models by Helpman (1993), Dear-
dorff (1992), Segerstrom et al. (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b), this
literature is interested in policies which help developing countries to catch up to
developed ones not only in welfare, but also in their R&D activity. Consequently,
this literature relaxes the previous restriction of the South to imitation and the
assumption that all innovation is conducted in the North.
Currie et al. (1999) analyze the effects of subsidies on southern economies at different
stages of development. While IPRs are not treated explicitly in their analysis, they
argue that subsidies to imitation have qualitatively the same effect as a loosening
in IPRs. Following this argument, an increase in IPRs would increase the world
rate of innovation and stimulate southern research activity if the South engages in
both imitation and innovation. Chapter 2 augmented this analysis by introducing
the imitation of southern goods and showed that stronger IPRs are associated with
more southern R&D and higher welfare if they surpass a threshold level. This
threshold level was shown to be decreasing in the southern research efficiency: If
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southern research is inefficient, then an increase in IPRs fails to stimulate R&D and
decreases welfare. However, the southern research efficiency which determines the
IPR threshold level in chapter 2 of this thesis and implicitly whether the South is
a pure imitator or both imitator and innovator in Currie et al. (1999), is exogenous
in both models.
To account for the fact that imitation can increase the knowledge transfer from
North to South and therefore encourage innovation, Glass (2010) presents a product
cycle model in which a given fraction of industries in the South has to engage in
imitation before they are able to conduct original R&D. While not treating the
effects of increases in IPRs explicitly, she shows that a general subsidy to the South
(to both innovation and imitation sector) increases the rate of innovation.
My model combines the approaches by Currie et al. (1999) and chapter 2 with the
one by Glass (2010) by endogenizing the southern R&D efficiency. Like Glass (2010),
I account for the idea that imitation can increase the southern innovative capability,
but I additionally introduce own R&D efforts as a source of efficiency gains. I thereby
endogenously capture the idea that the R&D enhancing effect of imitation becomes
less important if the own R&D sector becomes large. Consequently, I am able to
analyze the effects of IPRs on both, imitation and innovation focused countries,
while the model by Glass is more suitable for the former case.
The results of my model relate to the ones obtained in the literature on endogenous
IPRs. Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2008) show in a closed economy set-up that if
R&D firms face the costs of enforcing their intellectual property, multiple equilibria
with different levels of R&D and institutions (IPRs) can exist. As IPRs emerge
from innovators’ incentives to protect their returns to innovation, higher research is
related to higher levels of IPRs. While imitation decreases the expected returns to
innovation in their model, in my model, imitation can additionally raise the incentive
to conduct R&D through a learning channel. Consequently IPRs can decrease the
innovation incentives in my model and are thus not necessarily associated with higher
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R&D levels. Chen and Puttitanun (2005) model the trade-off between facilitating
technology adoption and encouraging original R&D in a developing county’s choice of
IPRs to explain the U-shaped relationship between a country’s level of development
and IPRs. While I try to explain the same pattern in the data, my model treats
the relationship between IPRs from a different perspective: Whilst the causation
in Chen and Puttitanun (2005) goes from the level of development to the strength
of IPRs in a country, my theory explains how the same levels of IPRs can cause
different levels of development.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 General set-up
Developed and developing countries are represented by two regions in this model:
the North and the South. Firms in North and South hire labor for the production of
consumption goods as well as for innovation and imitation. The two regions differ
in their R&D activities. The North engages only in innovation and is subject to
imitation by the South. The South imitates the North, engages in innovation and
is not subject to imitation. As long as a northern variety has not been copied, its
production takes place in the North, and the innovating firm charges the monopoly
price on the global market. Once a northern variety has been copied by the South, its
production shifts to the South and the northern firm shuts down. Labor is perfectly
mobile within all sectors across one region, but immobile between the regions such
that the same wage rate is paid to all workers within each region. Finally, trade
between North and South is costless.
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3.3.2 Households
Each region is endowed with a fixed number of households the size of which grows at a
constant rate gL so that the population size in North and South at time t is `∗t = l∗0egLt
and `t = l0egLt. Throughout the model northern variables are indicated with a star.
As households in both regions are symmetric in their preferences and face the same
maximization problem, I restrict the outline to the southern households’ problem
in the following. Each member of the household is endowed with one unit of labor
which he supplies inelastically to the labor market and earns a wage rate w. Agents
maximize their life time utility which arises from the consumption of a basket of Nt
different varieties available on the world market in each period:
U(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ−gL)t ln u(t)dt, u(t) =
[∫ Nt
0
xαj,tdj
] 1
α
. (3.1)
ρ it the rate of time preference and gL < ρ; xj,t is the per capita quantity demanded
of variety j, α is a measure of the degree of product differentiation, and ε = 11−α
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Agents face the budget constraint
a˙t = (rt− gL)at +wt− ct which equates the change in per capita asset holdings at to
the sum of income from interest payments rt (adjusted by population growth gL) and
wage income w minus per capita consumption expenditures ct. Maximizing (3.1)
subject to the income constraint yields the average demand by the world consumer
for variety j:
x¯t(j) =
c¯t
Pt
(
pt(j)
Pt
)−ε
. (3.2)
In this equation, average consumption expenditures are c¯t = ct`t+c
∗
t `
∗
t
Lt
with Lt = `t +
`∗t , and the price index is defined as Pt =
[
Nt∫
0
p(i)1−ε
] 1
1−ε
. Consumption expenditures
in North and South grow at the rate c˙
∗
t
c∗t
= r∗t − ρ and c˙tct = rt − ρ, respectively. This
means that northern (southern) per-capita consumption expenditures c∗t (ct) grow
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over time only if the market interest rate r∗t (rt) exceeds the individual discount rate
ρ.
3.3.3 Innovation
Innovation takes place in both regions. The total number of varieties invented in the
North (not imitated plus already imitated by the South) is n∗Rt + nCt . As southern
innovations do not face the risk of being imitated, the number of varieties invented
in the South is simply nRt . Thus the total number of varieties Nt available on the
world market is given by:
Nt = n∗Rt + nCt + nRt . (3.3)
Before a new variety can be produced, R&D firms in both regions have to hire
researchers `∗Rt and `Rt for the development of the research blueprint. Northern and
southern researchers invent new varieties according to the following R&D functions:
n˙∗Rt + n˙Ct =
N θt
a∗R
`∗Rt (3.4a)
n˙Rt =
N θt
aRβt
`Rt . (3.4b)
a∗R and aR are the northern and southern R&D cost parameters. The knowledge
capital used in the innovation process N θt is an increasing function of the number
of existing varieties in which the intertemporal knowledge spillover parameter θ is
restricted to 0 < θ < 1 so that knowledge spillovers become weaker over time. While
the knowledge capital is available to both regions, North and South differ in their
ability to efficiently use it. In particular, the development of the southern research
sector 1/βt is endogenized by letting southern R&D firms benefit from the research
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environment in their region:
1
βt
= nRt + φnCt
Nt
, φ < 1. (3.5)
This R&D efficiency function captures the following aspects: If the South’s share in
world innovation is high, the South is relatively more experienced in conducting own
R&D and more familiar with existing technologies which leads to a more efficient use
of the available world knowledge capital N θt . Further, the function also accounts for
an efficiency gain from imitation: The more the South engages in reverse engineering,
the more it is familiar with existing innovations and the easier is original R&D.
However, knowledge creation is just a by-product of imitation so that the research
efficiency benefits less from imitation than from original R&D (φ < 1).
In the production of non-copied varieties, one unit of labor produces one unit of
output. Innovators in both regions maximize profits pi∗Rt = (p∗Rt − w∗t )x¯∗RtLt and
piRt = (pRt−wt)x¯RtLt subject to the demand function (3.2). They charge a constant
mark-up over marginal costs and earn monopoly profits as long as they are not
copied:
p∗R =
w∗t
α
, pi∗R =
1− α
α
w∗t x¯
∗
RtLt (3.6a)
pR =
wt
α
, piR =
1− α
α
wtx¯RtLt. (3.6b)
If an innovator is copied, he shuts down his firm and earns zero profits.
3.3.4 Imitation
Before an imitated variety can be produced, imitation firms have to hire workers
who engage in reverse engineering. In modeling imitation as a costly activity I
follow Mansfield et al. (1981) who report that the costs of imitation are on average
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as high as 65% of the cost of innovation and that it takes 70% of the original
innovation time to imitate an innovation. Reverse engeneering is easier the more
non-copied goods are currently available (n∗Rt)θ as imitators are likely to target the
most technologically advanced innovations the latest. This modelling approach is in
the spirit of the model by Van Elkan (1996) in which imitation is easier the larger
the difference between the total number of innovations and already copied goods.
However, as southern inventions are not subject to imitation in my model, it is more
intuitive to define this distance as the number of northern innovations minus copied
northern innovations which is n∗Rt . The imitation function is thus given by:
n˙Ct =
(n∗Rt)θ
aCβt
`Ct . (3.7)
The parameter aC captures the cost of imitation and is interpreted as the strength
of intellectual property rights protection. The efficiency of the imitation sector
should also benefit from the innovation environment in the country: if workers are
able to better use the world knowledge capital in the innovation process, it should
be also easier for them to discover how already existing varieties are constructed.
Consequently, I let the R&D efficiency function 1/βt as defined in (3.5) enter the
imitation function.
In the production of copied varieties, one unit of labor also produces one unit of
output.22 Imitation of northern products takes advantage of the relatively low wage
rate in the South, such that by limit pricing the imitator can expel the innovator from
the market. I solve the model for an equilibrium in which the southern wage rate is
22 In a previous version of the model, the model was solved under the assumption that production
in the imitation sector is less efficient than in the innovation sector because one can argue
that the imitator does not have access to the original blueprint and no support from the
R&D firm to optimize the production process (Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2008)). This
assumption guarantees that the profits from imitation are lower than those from innovation,
and so will be the cost of developing the imitation blueprint in equilibrium. However, as none
of the results change without this inefficiency assumption, I relaxed it in favor of an improved
tractability of the model.
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lower than the northern one: w∗ > w. If the wage difference is high, i.e. w∗ > w/α,
the imitator’s monopoly price is lower than the innovators marginal cost, so that
the innovating firm has to shut down as soon as it is imitated. If the wage difference
is small, i.e. w∗ < w/α, it would be profit maximizing for the imitator to engage
in limit pricing and charge the innovator’s marginal cost. Following Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2010) I assume that the reversal of the decision to shut down a firm
is costly and that the maintenance of production facilities in the case of zero sales
incurs a positive cost. Consequently, it is profit maximizing for the northern firm
to shut down immediately once it is imitated. As a result, in both cases, southern
imitators maximize profits piCt = (pCt − wt)x¯RtLt subject to the demand function
(3.2) and earn the following monopoly prices and profits:
pCt =
wt
α
, piCt =
1− α
α
wtx¯CtLt. (3.8)
Southern innovations are not subject to imitation, because neither the North nor
the South have an advantage in production costs which gives the incentive for imi-
tation.23
3.3.5 Financial sectors
The value of an R&D or imitation firm vRt , v∗Rt or vC is given by its expected
discounted profits. As there is free entry into R&D and imitation, these expected
discounted profits have to be equal to the cost of the respective activity. This cost
is the wage paid to the innovators and reverse engineers. Using (3.4) and (3.7) to
determine the amount of labor required to develop one blueprint yields the following
23 To explicitly analyze the increase in incentives the southern R&D sector gains from stronger
IPRs, chapter 2 relaxed this assumption by introducing process innovation into a similar
framework. As the focus of this chapter is the analysis of the effects of IPRs on knowledge
spillovers from North to South, the imitation of southern products would not add much to
analysis, but make the model less tractable. It is thus not considered in this chapter.
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firm values:
v∗Rt =
a∗R
N θt
w∗t (3.9a)
vRt =
aRβt
N θt
wt (3.9b)
vCt =
aCβt
(n∗t )θ
wt. (3.9c)
There is perfect capital mobility between the innovation and imitation sectors within
one region, but financial autarky in North and South. Agents in the North choose
between holding the market portfolio with return r∗t and holding shares of the north-
ern innovation firms which pay a return pi∗Rt/v∗Rt . The return to innovation has to
be adjusted by the change in the value of the firm v˙∗Rt/v∗Rt and the risk of being
copied ιt = n˙Ct/n∗Rt . Southern agents choose between gaining the market rate rt
and holding shares of southern innovation or imitation firms. Southern returns to
innovation piRt/vRt and imitation piCt/vCt are adjusted by the firm value changes
v˙Rt/vRt and v˙Rt/vRt . No-arbitrage within these choices in each region implies the
following conditions for North and South:
r∗t =
pi∗Rt
v∗Rt
+ v˙
∗
Rt
v∗Rt
− n˙Ct
n∗Rt
(3.10a)
rt =
piRt
vRt
+ v˙Rt
vRt
= piCt
vCt
+ v˙Ct
vCt
. (3.10b)
3.3.6 Labor markets
Finally, labor market clearing requires `∗t = `∗Rt+`∗Yt for the North and `t = `Rt+`Ct+
`Yt for the South, in which `∗Yt and `Yt represent the employment in the production
sectors in North and South. Using the innovation and imitation functions (3.4) and
(3.7) to determine the labor requirement for the development of one innovation or
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imitation blueprint, these labor market clearing conditions can be written as:
`∗t = (n˙∗Rt + n˙Ct)
a∗R
nθt
+ n∗Rtx¯
∗
RtLt (3.11a)
`t = n˙Rt
aRβt
nθt
+ n˙Ct
aCβt
(n∗Rt)θ
+ (nRtx¯Rt + nCtx¯Ct)Lt. (3.11b)
The conditions say that the total labor force is allocated into innovation and pro-
duction in the North and into innovation, imitation and production in the South.
3.4 Balanced growth path
3.4.1 Definition of an equilibrium
In this model, an equilibrium (balanced growth path) consists of wages in North and
South and prices for the different varieties such that the allocation of (1) labor into
innovation and production in the North and innovation, imitation and production
in the South, (2) the number of varieties invented by both regions and imitated
by the South and (3) the amount of these varieties demanded by households and
supplied by firms solves (A) the households’ utility maximization problem and (B)
the firms’ profit maximization problem. Labor, goods and financial markets have to
clear given free entry into innovation and imitation in both regions.
On a balanced growth path, the variety shares ξ∗R = n∗Rt/Nt, ξR = nRt/Nt and
ξC = nCt/Nt, the shares of labor allocated into the different sectors in North (`∗Rt/`∗t ,
`∗Yt/`
∗
t ) and South (`Rt/`t, `Ct/`t, `Yt/`t), the South-North wage ratio ω = w/w∗, the
imitation rate ι = n˙Ct/n∗Rt and per capita consumption expenditures c∗ and c are
constant. Constant consumption expenditures imply that the risk free rates r and
r∗ are equal to the rate of time preference ρ in equilibrium. Constant variety shares
imply that the number of each kind of variety grows at the same constant rate g.
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When dividing the northern or southern innovation function by the total number of
varieties Nt it thus follows that the equilibrium world growth rate is given by:
N˙t
Nt
= n˙
∗
Rt
n∗Rt
= n˙Rt
nRt
= n˙Ct
nCt
= gL1− θ ≡ g. (3.12)
As the knowledge spillover parameter θ is smaller than one, the growth rate is
positive. From the semi-endogenous growth rate (3.12) follows that policy changes
do not have a long-run effect on growth.
3.4.2 Equilibrium characteristics
As there is free entry into R&D and imitation in both regions, the expected profits
from selling a variety have to be equal to the cost of developing its blueprint and
thus the firm values given in (3.9). As all varieties grow at a constant rate, (3.9)
implies that the firm values grow at the rate −θg. Using these facts in the no-
arbitrage conditions (3.10), rearranging with respect to the firm values and equating
with (3.9) gives the cost-benefit conditions for innovation in the North (3.13a) and
innovation and imitation in the South (3.13b) and (3.13c):
pi∗Rt
ρ+ θg + ι =
a∗R
N θt
w∗ (3.13a)
piRt
ρ+ θg =
aRβ
N θt
w (3.13b)
piCt
ρ+ θg =
aCβ
(n∗Rt)θ
w. (3.13c)
The left-hand sides of the relations represent the benefit (appropriately discounted
profits from innovation or imitation), while the right-hand sides represent the cost
of the respective activities (wages paid to researchers and reverse engineers for the
development of one blueprint). If the research efficiency 1/β was exogenous, then
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the effect of strengthening IPRs would clearly increase the costs of imitation and
therefore make southern innovation comparatively more attractive. Note, however,
that 1/β is a function of the imitative and innovative activity in the South, so that
we cannot immediately infer from the cost-benefit condition whether stronger IPRs
make imitation less attractive compared to innovation.
The relative demands for the different kinds of goods can be obtained from the
demand equation (3.2). The demand for non-copied northern innovations relative
to southern innovations is x¯∗Rt/x¯Rt = (w∗/w)
−ε = ωε and thus depends on the
relative wage between South and North. The demand for southern innovations
relative to imitations is x¯Rt/x¯Ct = 1. Substituting the profits (3.6b) and (3.8) into
the southern cost-benefit conditions (3.13b) and (3.13c) and combining them gives
the share of non-copied northern inventions in all varieties n∗Rt/Nt = ξ∗R:
ξ∗R =
(
aC
aR
) 1
θ ≡ R. (3.14)
As the sum of the different variety shares has to add up to one, 1 = ξ∗R + ξC + ξ∗R,
the share of varieties produced in the South (own inventions and copied northern
goods) is
ξR + ξC = 1−R. (3.15)
In a next step, I obtain the production quantity for a non-copied northern good x¯∗RtLt
from inserting the profit equation (3.6a) into the northern cost-benefit condition
(3.13a) and use the resulting relation x¯∗RtLt =
α
1−α
a∗R
Nθt
(ρ + θg + ι) in the northern
labor market clearing condition (3.11a). Substituting for the imitation rate by ι =
n˙C/n
∗
R = gξC/ξ∗R = g 1−ξR−RR and dividing the resulting equation by the northern
labor force `∗t then yields the following equilibrium relationship:
δ = 1− α
a∗R
(
g(1− ξR) + αR(ρ− gL)
) , (3.16)
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in which δ is a measure of product variety and is defined as
δ = N
1−θ
t
`∗t
. (3.17)
δ relates the difficulty of conducting research 1/N θt to the relative market size Nt/`∗t
and is constant in equilibrium.24 Equation (3.16) is the first equilibrium condition in
δ and the share of southern inventions in the total number of varieties ξR. It yields
a positive relationship between the two variables. As δ is an increasing function of
the total number of varieties Nt and the labor force size is exogenous, this means
that the number of varieties is higher the stronger the South’s focus on innovation.
As expression (3.16) is derived from the northern labor market clearing condition,
this positive effect is driven by the increase of northern innovation incentives: If the
southern research share increases, southern agents focus more on original R&D than
on imitation so that the share of copied goods and the imitation rate decrease and
the expected profits from northern innovation rise.
To analyze the second equilibrium condition, I insert the production quantities x¯RtLt
and x¯CtLt obtained from the southern cost-benefit conditions into the southern labor
market clearing condition (3.11b). Substituting for the research efficiency 1/β from
(3.5), rewriting the imitation rate and dividing the resulting expression by the size
of the northern labor force `∗t gives:
δ = (1− α)∆
`t
`∗t
(1− φ)ξR + φ(1−R)
aR(1−R) , (3.18)
in which ∆ = (1 − α)g + α(ρ + θg). This second equilibrium condition also yields
a positive relationship between the measure of product variety δ and the southern
research share ξR. As the expression is derived from the southern labor market
24 See Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) for a more detailed introduction of δ. Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2011) refer to δ as the relative research difficulty in their paper. In the context
of my work, I find it more intuitive to label δ as the measure of product variety so that it
cannot be confused with the research efficiency 1/β.
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clearing condition, the effect results from the positive impact of the innovation share
on the southern R&D efficiency which raises the incentives for the South to invent
new varieties.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the two equilibrium conditions and reveals the possibility of
multiple equilibria. Equating the two equilibrium conditions gives the solution for
ξR
δ
•
L
•H
North
South
Figure 3.1: Southern research share ξR and measure of product variety δ. L refers
to the imitation equilibrium, H refers to the innovation equilibrium.
the equilibrium southern research share(s) ξR:
ξ2R =
(
1− φ(2−R)
1− φ + αR
ρ− gL
g
)
ξR − 1−R1− φ
(
aR
a∗R
∆
g
`∗t
`
− φ
(
αR
ρ− gL
g
+ 1
))
.
(3.19)
This quadratic equation can yield none, one or two solutions associated with a
positive southern research share ξR. As the aim of this chapter is to relate IPRs
to different stages of innovative activity and development in a country, I will focus
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on the multiple solution case in the following. Equation (3.19) has two positive
solutions or no solution if the following condition is satisfied:
aR
a∗R
∆ `
∗
t
`t
g + α
(
aC
aR
) 1
θ (ρ− gL)
> φ. (3.20)
This condition says that the following factors favor the possibility of multiple equi-
libria (balanced growth paths) in this model: (1) An inefficient southern research
sector (high aR), (2) low initial IPRs (low aC), (3) a relatively small southern labor
force (small `t) and (4) small learning effects from imitation (small φ). This is equiv-
alent to saying that for given labor force sizes, learning efficiency from imitation,
level of IPRs and northern R&D efficiency, there exists an innovation inefficiency
threshold for the South a¯R.25 If this research inefficiency threshold is surpassed (i.e.
aR > a¯R), the model yields multiple equilibria. The inefficiency threshold is higher
the stronger IPRs, the larger the southern labor force and the less effective learning
from imitation. If condition (3.20) is fulfilled, then a sufficient condition for two
positive equilibria to exist is 12−R > φ.
26
For the case in which the multiple equilibria condition (3.20) is not satisfied, the
equilibrium with the lower southern innovation share ceases and only the equilibrium
with the higher innovation share prevails. This means that for a South which does
not face high research costs (aR < a¯R) there exists a unique equilibrium with a
higher southern research share. It is important to note that, as aC < aR by (3.14),
the equilibrium with low R&D activity cannot be ruled out by simply setting the
level of IPRs aC at a very high level: For the highest possible value of aC , the
denominator in (3.20) becomes g+α(ρ−gL), so that the equilibrium with the lower
25 This can be seen by rewriting condition (3.20) as
(
aR
aC
)1/θ (
aR
a∗
R
∆ `∗` − φg
)
> φα(ρ− gL). The
left-hand side of this expression is increasing in aR so that for sufficiently large aR = a¯R
condition (3.20) is fulfilled.
26 Naturally, the only interesting solutions are those in which the other variety shares are non-
negative as well, so that from (3.15) follows ξR < (1 − R) which I assume to be true in the
following.
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research share is still possible if southern R&D is very costly.
Proposition 1(i) If southern research is sufficiently costly (aR > a¯R), the model
features two equilibria associated with positive southern research activity. (ii) The
inefficiency threshold a¯R is increasing in the strength of IPR protection, in the size
of the southern labor force and the northern research costs; it is decreasing in the
intensity of learning from imitation.
What are the characteristics of these two equilibria in terms of the economic out-
comes? As both equilibrium conditions are increasing functions in ξR, the equilib-
rium with the high southern research share ξR is associated with a high measure of
product variety δ. It is thus labeled as the "innovation equilibrium" (see intersection
H in figure 3.1). In the equilibrium in which ξR is low, the product variety is also
low. As the share of goods produced in the South 1 − R is the same in both equi-
libria, the second equilibrium is associated with a higher share of imitated goods
than the innovation equilibrium and is therefore labeled "imitation equilibrium" (see
intersection L in figure 3.1). Whilst the share of goods produced in the North ξ∗R is
thus the same in both equilibria, the South specializes in innovation or imitation. If
it specializes in innovation (higher ξR, lower ξC), the absolute number of non-copied
northern varieties and southern inventions will be higher in every period on the bal-
anced growth path.27 If it specializes in imitation (lower ξR, higher ξC), then these
numbers will be smaller.
The southern research efficiency is given by 1/β = (1− φ)ξR + φ(1−R) in equilib-
rium. From this relation follows that the South’s research efficiency is higher in the
innovation equilibrium and lower in the imitation equilibrium.
27 This follows from the fact that a higher southern research share ξR is associated with a higher
measure of product variety δ and thus with a higher total number of varieties Nt in every
period.
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I now turn to the determination of the remaining important variables of the model.
The relative wage rate ω = w/w∗ between South and North is an indicator of
how close the two regions are in their development. It is obtained by combining
the northern cost-benefit condition (3.13a) with one of the southern cost-benefit
conditions. Substituting for the research efficiency 1/β from (3.5) and the shares
of copied and non-copied northern goods ξC and ξ∗R from (3.14) and (3.15) gives
an expression for the relative wage between South and North ω and the share of
southern innovations ξR:
(ρ+ θg)ωε = a
∗
R
aR
(
(1− φ)ξR + φ(1−R)
)(
ρ+ θg + g1−R− ξR
R
)
. (3.21)
The first term in (3.21) on the right-hand side is increasing in the southern research
share: When ξR increases, the South becomes more efficient in R&D and imitation.
This effect increases the southern wage and thus the relative wage in (3.21). The
second term is decreasing in the southern research share: When ξR increases, by
(3.15) the share of copied northern goods decreases which decreases the risk of being
copied for the North. This effect increases the northern wage rate and thereby
decreases the relative wage in (3.21). To determine whether the relative wage is
higher in the innovation or in the imitation equilibrium, I substitute the two solutions
from (3.19) into the wage equation (3.21) and compare the expressions. The results
reveal that the wage gap between the regions is lower in the innovation equilibrium.
Equilibrium utility, per-capita asset holdings and consumption in each region are
determined in the next step. From the budget constraint, constant equilibrium
wages w and w∗ and per-capita asset holdings imply that per capita consumption
in North and South is given by c∗ = w∗ + (ρ − gL)a∗ and c = w + (ρ − gL)a,
respectively. As domestic savings finance domestic investments in this model, total
asset holdings in the North are A∗t = n∗Rtv∗Rt , and total asset holdings in the South
are At = nRtvRt+nCtvCt . Substituting for the firm values from (3.9) and multiplying
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and dividing by the northern labor force size `∗t , per-capita asset holdings can be
expressed as a∗ = Rw∗a∗Rδ and a = (1 − R)aRwβδ `
∗
t
`t
. Substituting a∗ and a back
into the expressions for c∗ and c gives the following per-capita consumption in North
and South:
c∗ = w∗(1 + (ρ− gL)Ra∗Rδ) (3.22a)
c = w
(
1 + (ρ− gL)(1−R)aRβδ `
∗
t
`t
)
. (3.22b)
The northern wage rate can be used as the numeraire and therefore set equal to
one. Then the relative wage ω is equal to the southern wage rate w. As ω is higher
in the innovation equilibrium, substituting for δ and β reveals that per capita asset
holdings and consumption expenditures in both regions are high in the innovation
equilibrium and low in the imitation equilibrium. However, these quantities are
nominal, and to obtain real consumption and thus equilibrium welfare, the price
level has to be considered.
Substituting the solutions for the variety shares from (3.14) and (3.15) into the
definition of the price index gives an expression of the price index as a function of
wages and the number of varieties: Pt = 1α(R(w
∗)1−ε+(1−R)w1−ε) 11−εn 11−ε . Accord-
ing to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), real consumption c∗/Pt and c/Pt then represents
consumers’ utility at time t, so that utilities in North and South are given by:
u∗t =
c∗
Pt
, ut =
c
Pt
. (3.23)
Substituting for the southern consumption expenditures it can then be shown that
the southern balanced growth path utility is higher in the innovation equilibrium
than in the imitation equilibrium. Nominal per capita consumption expenditures
c∗ and c are constant, and the aggregate price level Pt is decreasing over time so
that northern and southern utilities u∗t and ut are growing over time. As utility is
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proportional to consumption expenditures holding prices fixed, its growth rate can
be interpreted as real consumption growth or economic growth. The equilibrium
economic growth rate is thus given by u˙∗t/u∗t = u˙t/ut = g/(ε − 1) > 0. As utility
grows constantly and at the same rate in both regions in equilibrium, looking at a
the changes of one-period equilibrium utility u∗0 and u0 is equivalent to looking at
the long-run welfare changes.
I summarize the findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (i) In the innovation (imitation) equilibrium, the total number of
existing varieties, non-copied northern goods and southern inventions as well as the
southern research share and the southern research development are high (low), the
share of copied goods is low (high), the imitation rate is low (high), the wage gap
between the regions is small (large), and per capita consumption and assets in both
regions as well as southern welfare are high (low). (ii) For a sufficiently efficient
southern research sector (aR < a¯R) the imitation equilibrium ceases, and the model
has a unique innovation equilibrium.
3.5 Balanced growth path effects of stronger in-
tellectual property rights
In this section, I analyze how stronger IPRs affect the distribution of production to
North and South, both regions’ R&D activities and world product variety depending
on whether the South is in an innovation or imitation equilibrium. The effects on
equilibrium utility will be analyzed numerically in section 3.6. Please note that the
effects described in this section can be only interpreted as a comparison between
two worlds which are in the innovation equilibrium (one with stronger and one with
weaker IPRs) and a comparison between two worlds in the imitation equilibrium
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(again one with stronger and one with weaker IPRs), respectively. To analyze the
effects of changes in IPRs on a single country would require a detailed stability
analysis of the equilibria which proved to be analytically unfeasible for the given
set-up.
Independently of the equilibrium of the model, the share of non-copied northern
goods (ξ∗R) as well as the share of goods produced in the South (ξR + ξC) is given
by equations (3.14) and (3.15). Clearly, the share of non-copied southern goods is
increasing in the level of IPR protection (aC) and decreasing in the cost of southern
R&D (aR). As ξR+ξC = 1−ξ∗R, the effects go in the opposite direction for the share
of varieties produced in the South. The intuition is as follows: when IPRs increase,
imitation costs and therefore the labor requirement for imitation rises such that
northern innovations are targeted less frequently, and a higher share of products is
produced in the North. On the other hand, if research becomes more expensive in
the South, imitations becomes more attractive relative to innovation, so the share of
non-copied southern goods decreases which means that a higher share of products
is produced in the South.
However, the decrease in the share of goods produced in the South caused by an
increase in the level of IPRs can have several sources: Either both, the share of copied
goods and southern inventions, decrease, or one share increases and the other share
decreases more strongly. To analyze the effect of IPRs on the southern innovation
share, I apply the implicit function theorem to the southern research share equation
(3.19) which reveals the following conditions:
∂ξ˜R
∂aC
> 0 if ξ˜R >
g
(
1− φ(2−R)
)
+ αR(ρ− gL)(1− φ)
2g(1− φ) (3.24a)
∂ξ˜R
∂aC
< 0 if ξ˜R <
g
(
1− φ(2−R)
)
+ αR(ρ− gL)(1− φ)
2g(1− φ) . (3.24b)
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These conditions indicate that an increase in IPRs increases the southern research
share if the South’s initial research share surpasses a threshold level, and decreases it
otherwise. Solving the quadratic equation in ξR (3.19) in the last section shows that
condition (3.24a) is fulfilled in the innovation equilibrium, and condition (3.24b)
holds in the imitation equilibrium.
The different effects of changes in IPRs on the research share can be intuitively
explained by looking at the dominant source of research development in the South.
The research efficiency function 1/β in (3.5) captures two sources of R&D develop-
ment: innovation and imitation. If the economy is in the innovation equilibrium,
R&D is mainly driven by ξR, such that higher IPRs (aC ↑) decrease the incentives
to conduct imitation (the minor source of development) and thereby increase the
incentives for innovation (the major source of development).
In the imitation equilibrium, the R&D development is more driven by imitation. In
this case, increasing IPRs (=costlier imitation) leads to a deterioration in the re-
search environment in both sectors by increasing β, but it hurts the imitation sector
less than proportionately, because imitation becomes easier compared to innovation
if the share of non-copied northern goods increases.
While the innovation and production shares give an idea of how the distribution of
R&D in the world changes with stronger IPRs, the assessment of the actual research
output requires a look at the total number of invented varieties in equilibrium. I
therefore examine the equilibrium effect of a change in IPRs on δ = N
1−θ
t
`∗t
by in-
serting the equilibrium southern innovation shares ξ˜R into one of the equilibrium
conditions (3.16) and (3.18).28 As δ˜ is increasing in both IPRs and research share
in (3.18), and ∂ξR
∂aC
> 0 for the innovation equilibrium, it follows that ∂δ˜
∂aC
> 0, and
thus IPRs increase the equilibrium total number of varieties if the economy is in the
28 The effect of an increase in IPRs is most easily to be seen if substituting the high-R&D-ξ˜R
into (3.18) and the low-R&D-ξ˜R into (3.16).
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innovation equilibrium. As δ is increasing in ξR, but decreasing in IPRs in (3.18)
and ∂ξ˜R
aC
< 0 in the imitation equilibrium, IPRs decrease δ and therefore the total
number of existing varieties in that case. Figure 3.2 depicts these equilibrium effects
graphically.
ξR
δ
•
L
•H
•
L’
• H’
North
South
Figure 3.2: Effects of stronger IPRs (aC ↑) on the southern research share ξR and the
measure of product variety δ. H and L denote innovation equilibrium and imitation
equilibrium for a low level of IPRs. H ′ and L′ depict the innovation equilibrium and
imitation equilibrium for a case with stronger IPRs.
From the effect on the total number of varieties also immediately follows that the
number of southern inventions increases (decreases) with stronger IPRs in the inno-
vation (imitation) equilibrium. These results reveal a U-shaped relationship between
research activity and IPRs: For economies whose major source of learning is imita-
tion, stronger IPRs are c.p. associated with less own R&D efforts. For economies
which rely less on the imitation of foreign goods, because their research sector has
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reached a critical size and is therefore sufficiently efficient, stronger IPRs are asso-
ciated with a higher share in world R&D and a higher absolute research output.
Proposition 3: (a) For innovation equilibria, stronger IPRs are associated with
larger shares of southern inventions, higher total numbers of varieties and higher
absolute numbers of southern inventions. (b) For imitation equilibria, stronger IPRs
accompany smaller shares of southern inventions, lower total numbers of varieties
and lower absolute numbers of southern inventions. (c) Stronger IPRs always in-
crease the share of non-copied northern goods and decrease the share of products
produced in the South.
3.6 Numerical welfare analysis
The effects of changes in IPRs on welfare in both regions are hard to obtain analyt-
ically so that I have to calibrate the model to look at them numerically.
The World Bank (2009) reports that the ratio of low and middle income countries
to high income countries was given by `
`∗ = 5.27 in 2008 and the average world pop-
ulation growth rate between 1960 and 2008 was 1.68% (gL = 0.0168). Analoguously
to Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010, 2011) and chapter 2 of this dissertation, I set
the intertemporal knowledge spillover parameter to θ = 0.67 to target the average
US GDP per capita growth rate from 1950-1994 (Jones, 2005) and the measure of
product differentiation to α = 0.714 to target a 40% markup over marginal cost as
estimated by Basu (1996) and Norrbin (1993).
The rate of time preference is set to ρ = 0.02. The northern wage rate is used as
the numeraire and thus set to w∗ = 1. Also, the cost parameter in the northern
R&D function is normalized to a∗R = 1. The southern R&D cost parameter is set
to aR = 2.5 which leads to about five to six times higher R&D costs in the South
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depending on whether the innovation or imitation equilibrium is considered. The
cost of imitation is set to aC = 1.5 so that the costs of imitation (without accounting
for knowledge capital) constitute 60% of the innovation cost in the same country
which is in line with the estimates reported by Mansfield et al. (1981). Further, I
set the imitation learning parameter to φ = 0.2 which says that learning from R&D
is five times more efficient than learning from imitation. The parameterization
fulfills the multiple equilibria condition (3.20), so that both the imitation and the
innovation equilibrium exist. As utility grows constantly and at the same rate in
both regions in equilibrium, the effects on a single equilibrium period utility can be
interpreted as long-run welfare effects.29
Table 3.1 reports the effect of a marginal change in IPRs (aC changes by 1%) on
long-run welfare in North and South as well as relative consumption between South
and North u0/u∗0 = c/c∗.
innovation equilibrium imitation equilibrium
IPRs (aC) 1.5 aC ↑ by 1% 1.5 aC ↑ by 1%
welfare South (u0) 11.083 11.788 8.947 8.471
welfare North (u∗0) 17.141 18.393 13.813 13.180
relative cons. (c/c∗) 0.647 0.641 0.648 0.643
Table 3.1: Welfare effects of stronger IPRs.
First, notice that the northern long-run welfare is higher in the innovation than in
the imitation equilibrium which is mainly driven by the increased number of varieties
supplied in the innovation equilibrium due to a more efficient southern R&D sector
(for the South, the higher welfare has been already established in the analytical
part).
29 For a similar approach see, for example, Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010, 2011). Note,
however, that this approach does not take into account the short-run welfare effects for which
a detailed dynamic analysis would be necessary which proved to be unfeasible for the given
set-up.
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How different levels of IPRs influence equilibrium utility depends on the type of
equilibrium. In the innovation equilibrium, higher IPRs are accompanied by higher
welfare for both regions. The North benefits slightly overproportionately compared
to the South as relative consumption between South and North decreases. This
happens because stronger IPRs let the North benefit from both, higher product
variety and a lower risk of being imitated whilst the South only benefits from higher
product variety.30
In the imitation equilibrium, welfare is lower if IPRs are stronger, and the South
is hurt more than proportionately compared to the North in this case. While both
regions suffer from the decrease in product variety, the North is at least partially
compensated for this loss by a lower risk of imitation.31 The results imply that
stronger IPRs in developing countries without sufficiently developed research sector
do not only hurt these developing countries, but can have negative welfare implica-
tions for developed countries as well.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter endogenizes the southern research sector’s development in a North-
South increasing variety model of non-scale growth. It follows the evidence from
East Asian countries that the development of a research sector can be positively
affected by the imitation of foreign technologies, but also recognizes that, with a
sufficiently developed research sector, own innovative efforts contribute more to the
R&D efficiency in a country.
30 Introducing imitation of southern goods could change this overcompensation of the North.
With imitation of the South, stronger IPRs would benefit the South by both, increasing the
number of available varieties and decreasing the risk of imitation.
31 Again, this overproportional loss of the South could be changed by introducing southern
imitation into the framework as the South would then be also compensated by a lower risk of
imitation.
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The presented model allows the efficiency of the southern research sector to depend
positively on how intensively southern firms engage in imitation and innovation. I
show that the model can yield multiple equilibria associated with positive imitative
and innovative southern activity if the southern research costs surpass a critical
threshold level.
In the imitation equilibrium, the southern research sector is small and inefficiently
develops a small number of varieties, the southern welfare is low. In this equilibrium,
the North faces a high risk of imitation, and the world research output is low. In
contrast, the innovation equilibrium yields high product variety, a low imitation risk,
a relatively large southern research sector which efficiently develops a large number
of varieties, and high welfare in both regions.
Depending on the size of the southern innovation sector, stronger IPRs have different
implications. If the southern R&D sector is small and its efficiency is thus mainly
imitation driven, an increase in IPRs can dampen innovative activity and welfare in
both, the developed and developing region. If the R&D sector is sufficiently large
and its efficiency is therefore mainly driven by own innovative activity, then stronger
IPRs are associated with higher innovation output and welfare in both regions.
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Chapter 4
Intellectual Property Rights as
Development Determinants∗
4.1 Introduction
Development determinants have long been the focus of cross-country growth regres-
sions, which are well known to be subject to substantial model uncertainty (Barro
(1997); Durlauf et al. (2005). This model uncertainty manifests itself in the vast
number of candidate regressors that have been suggested by competing strands of
growth and development theories. Durlauf et al. (2005) survey no fewer than 140
growth determinants for the Handbook of Economic Growth. Therefore it is not
surprising that prominent approaches to development regressions conduct robust-
ness exercises that juxtapose literally dozens of theories and candidate regressors.32
Conspicuously absent from this entire literature is, however, one approach that in-
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Theo Eicher.
32 Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) alone introduce more than 50 candidate
regressors.
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cludes the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) as a potential development
determinant.33
The omission is surprising, given that IPRs are the central driving force of economic
performance in all R&D based growth models.34 Property rights over innovations
guarantee returns for investors, whose inventions constitute the ultimate engine for
long term development. In sharp contrast, the protection of physical property (e.g.,
capital investment) has long been widely accepted as a core determinant regressor
in development empirics (as measured by "Rule of Law" or "risk of expropriation").35
We follow the canonical development determinant approach of Hall and Jones (1999),
Acemoglu et al. (2001), and Rodrik et al. (2004), and introduce IPRs as an addi-
tional candidate regressor into this well established line of development regressions.
Conceptually we could simply add IPRs to each one of the regressions suggested
by the previous literature and report the IPR significance levels. Raftery (1995)
points out, however, that significance levels are inflated when coefficients are based
on a single statistical model whenever the uncertainty surrounding the validity of
the particular theory is ignored. Instead, we thus use a statistical methodology that
allows us to introduce IPRs while simultaneously addressing the profound model un-
certainty that has been highlighted by the vast number of development specifications
in the previous literature.
We analyze the impact of IPRs on development using Bayesian Model Averaging
(BMA), which is designed to resolve model uncertainty as part of the statistical
33 While the relationship between IPRs and growth is the subject of a voluminous literature
(Gould and Gruben, 1996; Kim et al., 2011) the effect of IPRs is usually not studied in cross-
country development regressions, and never before with explicit endogeneity controls, see, e.g.,
Maskus and Penubarti (1995), Ginarte and Park (1997), Maskus (2000), Chen and Puttitanun
(2005).
34 Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) assume perfect IPRs; and it is easily shown that
the canonical R&D based growth model produces reduced growth and welfare with imperfect
IPRs (Eicher and García-Peñalosa, 2008).
35 An alternative strand of the literature focuses on the effect of political institutions, see, e.g.,
Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Besley et al. (2005).
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methodology.36 The added complication that development regressions posit is that
their model uncertainty is not confined by development determinants, but it is also
present at the instrument level. Instruments are used to address the endogeneity of
development determinants and to identify their exact effects on income. Appropriate
instruments have also been the subject of a voluminous literature comprised of
a sizable set of alternative theories. Instead of juxtaposing particular instrument
specifications in what Rodrik et al. (2004) call a "horse race" approach, we employ the
Lenkoski et al. (forthcoming) Two-Stage Least Squares BMA (2SBMA) procedure
to account for model uncertainty at the development determinant and instrument
levels.
To explore the effects of IPRs, we use Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al.
(2004)’s own data and augment it with the Park (2008b) patent index. Figure 1
plots the dependent variable in Acemoglu et al./Rodrik et al., per capita income,
against Park’s (2008b) patent index and reveals a clear positive relationship. We
are not the first to highlight the correlation between the intellectual property rights
index and development;37 we are, however, the first to address causality and model
uncertainty to clarify whether better IPRs foster high incomes or whether high levels
of development produce excellent IPRs.38
The 2SBMA methodology addresses the issue of causality by introducing instru-
ments that identify the particular effect of IPRs on development. To motivate
potential instruments for IPRs we follow the law and economics literature, which
suggests that a particular type of legal origin provides the necessary identification
for legal institutions today (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Djankov et al., 2003).
36 See, e.g., Fernandez et al. (2001), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) and Masanjala and Papageorgiou
(2008).
37 See, e.g., Maskus and Penubarti (1995), Maskus (2000), and Ginarte and Park (1997).
38 Ginarte and Park (1997) tested the latter hypothesis, but do not control for endogeneity.
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Figure 4.1: Development and Intellectual Property Rights
After addressing model uncertainty and causality, we find that IPR protection,
specifically patent protection, exerts an important impact on development. This
impact is separate and parallel to the impact of Rule of Law on development. The
result highlights that both dimensions of property rights protection are crucial de-
velopment determinants. We can also show that the impact of IPRs is causal, as our
identification strategy posits that IPRs drive income, and our tests of instrument
validity support this hypothesis.
In addition we show that the impact of patent rights on development depends cru-
cially on the degree of intellectual property rights enforcement. As long as patent
rights are simply "on the books" but not enforced, they are shown to exert no effect
on development. It is the level of enforced patent rights that is positively correlated
with development.39 The magnitude of the impact of IPR enforcement on devel-
opment is remarkable: increasing enforcement by one standard deviation causes a
39 Enforcement is measured in terms of the stringency of preliminary injunctions, the existence
of contributory infringement pleadings, and burden-of-proof reversals.
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42% increase in long term development. Coincidentally this effect is just about the
same in magnitude as the impact of Rule of Law on development. To illustrate
the importance of the two dimensions of property rights protection, we can con-
sider two countries at either end of the development spectrum in 1995: The US,
with $27,806 per capita income and Brazil, with $6,820. Our results suggest that if
Brazil adopted the same level of Rule of Law and IPR enforcement as the US, its
predicted per capita income would more than triple to $24,323.
We are not the first to attempt to resolve endogeneity and identify proximate and
fundamental development determinants. Alternative approaches to explain devel-
opment include Mauro (1995), who first suggested ethnolinguistic fragmentation as
a fundamental determinant of corruption although the subsequent literature focuses
on "Rule of Law" as a more basic development determinant. Hall and Jones (1999)
introduced latitude and common language as instruments for an institutional proxy
that is a composite of trade, corruption and rule of law. We include these candidate
instruments below and highlight the importance of the latter. La Porta et al. (2004)
presented yet another "horse race" of theories, juxtaposing judicial independence
vs. constitutional review; we employ their hypothesis that judicial characteristics
matter in order to motivate candidate instruments in our analysis. Lenkoski et al.
(forthcoming) apply 2SBMA to development determinants, but neglect IPRs.
We proceed as follows: section 4.2 outlines the statistical approach that underlies
2SBMA and discusses theoretical properties of the technique, section 4.3 describes
the data, section 4.4 discusses the key results and highlights the importance of both
determinant and instrument uncertainty in the recent development literature, and
section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 The Econometric Approach
Acemoglu et al. (2001) suggest a particular theory of development, namely that
private property rights (as measured by government risk of expropriation) are a
crucial development determinant, and that the security of such property rights is
crucially dependent on the type of colonial history a country experienced. Rodrik
et al. (2004) broaden the definition of development determinants and conduct an
all out "horse race" of three potential determinants (private property rights, trade,
and geography) against a host of alternative theories. Acemoglu et al. (2001) and
Rodrik et al. (2004) constitute the most rigorous robustness tests that have been
conducted; the studies employ the largest set of potential development theories to
justify and juxtapose candidate regressors.
Both studies acknowledge that the effects of proximate development determinants
are endogenous and apply the 2SLS instrumental variable technique to identify the
specific effect that each determinant exerts on development. A complicating factor
is, however, that competing theories suggest alternative sets of different instruments.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) approach this issue by juxtaposing
not only theories of development determinants, but also theories that motivate alter-
native instruments against another. Profound model uncertainty thus contaminates
coefficient estimates at both the instrument and the determinant level. To examine
the effects of IPRs on development we adopt Acemoglu et al. and Rodrik et al.’s
approach and data augmented by Park’s IPR index.
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4.2.2 Statistical Foundations
Instead of producing numerous robustness regressions, we resolve the model uncer-
tainty using a statistical methodology that was specifically designed for that task,
Two-Stage Least Squares Bayesian Model Averaging (2SBMA). 2SBMA combines
the instrumental variable and BMA methodologies to process the data like a two
stage estimator, while addressing model uncertainty in both stages. It is a nested
approach that first determines the posterior model probabilities in the first stage via
straight BMA to ascertain whether any instruments receive support from the data.
Then 2SBMA model averages using the fitted values to derive second stage posterior
model probabilities, means, and standard deviations. The weight of each model in
the second stage depends not only on its performance, but also on the performance
of the particular set of instruments that gave rise to the particular second stage
model.
In addition to resolving model uncertainty, Bayesian model averaging minimizes the
sum of Type I and Type II error, the mean squared error, and generates predic-
tive distributions with optimal predictive performance (Raftery and Zheng, 2003).
2SBMA is also consistent and it reduces the many instrument bias that is especially
relevant in approaches that juxtapose a number of alternative candidate regressors
(Lenkoski et al., forthcoming). Below we provide a sketch of the 2SBMA method-
ology, limiting our discussion to the properties relevant to our application and refer
the interested reader to the comprehensive tutorial and derivations by Raftery et al.
(1997) and Lenkoski et al. (forthcoming) for further discussion.
The standard approach to addressing endogeneity of development determinants is to
apply two-stage least squares (2SLS) and impose over-identification and instrument
restrictions according to
Y = α +
p∑
j=1
βjXj + η, (4.1)
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in which Y is the dependent variable, X is a vector of candidate regressors which is
comprised of a vector ofW endogenous andD exogenous variables. Reverse causality
is of utmost interest in development regressions. Are countries rich because they
have good institutions or property rights, or are property rights strong in countries
that are sufficiently wealthy to maintain them? In the presence of endogeneity, the
determination of W leads to inconsistent estimates of the entire coefficient in (4.1).
The 2SLS estimator solves the consistency problem, but relies on the existence of a
set of instruments, Z, which are independent of Y , given the vector of covariates X.
To identify the effect of W on Y , the researcher must suggest a set of instruments,
Z such that
W = δ + θZZ + θDD + ε. (4.2)
The IV estimates derived in a second stage by using the fitted values from the first
stage (4.2) are consistent only if the conditional independence assumptions are valid.
Theories seldom present clear-cut instruments that have both strong explanatory
power on the endogenous variables and unquestionable conditional independence
properties in relation to the dependent variable. Over-identification tests such as
the one proposed by Sargan (1958) help verify the validity of the instrument as-
sumptions.
The 2SBMA setup can be concisely summarized as follows. Let ∆ be a quantity of
interest and M the set of potential models that is comprised of I individual models
in the first stage. The posterior distribution of ∆ given the data, D, is given by the
weighted average of the predictive distribution under each model,
pr(∆
∣∣∣∣D) = I∑
i=1
pr(∆
∣∣∣∣Mi,D)pii (4.3)
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in which pr(∆
∣∣∣∣Mi,D) is the predictive distribution and the model weight is
pii = pr(Mi
∣∣∣∣D) ∝ ∫ pr(D∣∣∣∣θi,Mi)µ(θi)dθiγ(Mi). (4.4)
The model weight is thus comprised of the posterior probability for model Mi and
the prior densities for parameters and models, µ(θi) and γ(Mi), respectively. Intu-
itively, this implies that a model’s weight is proportional to its relative efficiency
in describing the data. Posterior model probabilities are also the weights used to
establish the posterior means and variances
θˆBMA =
I∑
i∈M
θˆipii, (4.5)
σˆ2
BMA =
I∑
i∈M
piiσˆi
2 +
I∑
I∈M
pii
(
θˆi − θˆiBMA
)2
. (4.6)
The BMA posterior mean is thus the weighted sum of all posterior means, where
the weight is the quality of the model that generated a particular coefficient. The
posterior variance is the sum of the weighted variances for each model plus a sec-
ond term that indicates how much the estimates differ across models. To provide
economically meaningful coefficient estimates we condition the posterior mean and
variance on whether a regressor is included in the model. By summing the posterior
model probabilities over all models that include a candidate regressor, we obtain the
posterior inclusion probability
pr
(
θˆi 6= 0
∣∣∣∣D) = ∑
i∈M
pii. (4.7)
The posterior inclusion probability of a regressor is the probability that a variable is
included in the true model. It provides a probability statement regarding the impor-
tance of a regressor that directly addresses the researcher’s prime concern: what is
the probability that the coefficient has a non-zero effect on the dependent variable?
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The posterior inclusion probability thus also carries an important interpretation that
goes beyond the information contained in standard p-values.
General rules developed by Jeffreys (1961) and refined by Kass and Raftery (1995)
stipulate effect-thresholds for posterior probabilities. Posterior probabilities < 50%
are seen as evidence against an effect, and the evidence for an effect is either weak,
positive, strong, or decisive for posterior probabilities ranging from 50-75%, 75-95%,
95-99%, and> 99%, respectively. In our analysis, we refer to a regressor as "effective"
if its posterior inclusion probability exceeds 50%.
To address endogeneity, 2SBMA first determines the posterior model probabilities
as outlined above as well as the first stage fitted values, w˜i, for each model Mi.
Denoting the set of j second stage models as L, 2SBMA then uses the fitted values
to derive second stage posterior probabilities and estimates, vj(w˜i) and βˆj(w˜i) to
obtain the posterior mean
βˆ2SBMA =
I∑
i∈M
J∑
j∈L
vj(w˜i)piiβˆj(w˜i). (4.8)
The posterior mean consists of the combination of weighted fitted values from the
first stage models and the weighted posteriors means of the second stage models.
The model weight, or the quality of the first stage instrumentation thus influences
the overall model weight of a second stage coefficient. The posterior variance and
inclusion probability are then
σˆ2
2SBMA =
I∑
i∈M
pii
 J∑
j∈L
vjσ
2
j +
J∑
j∈L
vj
(
βˆj − β¯
)2+ I∑
i∈M
pii
(
β¯i − βˆi2SBMA
)2
(4.9)
pr
(
βˆj 6=
∣∣∣∣D) = ∑
i∈M
∑
j∈L
vjpii, (4.10)
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in which β¯ is the model averaged estimate for a given first stage model, Mi. The
2SBMA variance has a similar interpretation as the BMA variances. The first term
is the average of BMA variances associated with the first stage models, and the
second term represents the variation of a given first stage model’s BMA estimates
relative to the overall 2SBMA estimate.
4.3 Data
Our data was collected from four major sources. Acemoglu et al. (2001) provide
data on settler mortality and religion, Park (2008b) provides the IPR index, which
is in fact an index of patent protection, and La Porta et al. (1998) provide data on
the legal origins of a country. All other variables suggested in the comprehensive
robustness approach are obtained from Rodrik et al. (2004). Acemoglu et al. (2001)’s
sample covers 64 countries, but the combination with IPR data limits our sample
to 54 observations.
Table 4.1 provides the key descriptive statistics for all variables. For example, GDP
per capita ranges from $519 (Tanzania) to $27,806 (US) with a mean of $4,825, and
Rule of Law ranges from 1.71 (New Zealand) to −1.49 (Angola), with a mean of
−0.28. Park’s patent index is the sum of five equally weighted sub-indices (patent
length, scope, enforcement, the protection from loss of patent rights and member-
ship in patent treaties).40 It evaluates the strength of a country’s patent system on a
scale of 0 (poor patent system) to 5 (strong patent system) with US (4.48) being the
strongest and Angola (0.0) the weakest. Patent enforcement is measured on a scale
of 0 to 1 scale on which 1 is obtained if a country has all of the following enforce-
ment mechanisms: preliminary injunctions, contributory infringement pleadings and
burden-of-proof reversals.
40 This index is an updated version of the Ginarte and Park (1997) index, see Park (2008b).
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To identify the effect of physical and intellectual property rights on development re-
quires instruments that influence property rights directly but are unlikely to impact
the income level in 1995 directly. To identify the security of physical property rights,
Acemoglu et al. (2001) propose settler mortality, which indicates whether a country
was a settlement or extraction colony. Countries with the latter history are pre-
sumed to have adopted weaker property rights institutions. Alternative instruments
for physical property rights are the fractions of the English or European language
speaking population in a country (Hall and Jones, 1999), which are hypothesized
to serve as measures of the colonial powers’ commitment to building good property
rights institutions.
To introduce IPRs, we are required to propose additional instruments, and we rely
on a country’s type of legal origin. Specifically we follow the law and economics lit-
erature, which suggests either English common law or Roman (in particular French)
civil law (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999) legal origins to have a profound impact on
how intellectual property rights are considered by today’s legal system. David and
Brierley (1985) show that corporate law and commercial laws vary systematically
by legal origin, and that French legal origins (civil law) are associated with greater
formalism of judicial procedures (Djankov et al., 2003) and less judicial indepen-
dence La Porta et al. (2004). The latter has been associated with better contract
enforcement and greater security of property rights.
Since the legal traditions were typically introduced into various countries through
conquest and colonization, they are considered largely exogenous, which qualifies
them as strong candidate instruments. The remaining variables included in our
estimation are candidate regressors that have been previously argued to exert an
effect on development and that were included in Rodrik et al. (2004)’s robustness
checks.
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4.4 Quantifying the Effects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights on Development
This section reports the results of the 2SBMA estimation that introduces IPRs to
the canonical development regressions by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al.
(2004) and resolves model uncertainty as part of the statistical procedure. We
commence with the results for the aggregate patent index.
Columns 2–4 and 5–6 in Table 2 reveal that our instrument strategy provides two ef-
fective instruments for patents (fraction of English speaking population in a country
and French legal origin) and that physical property rights are also well identified.
The Bayesian Sargan test (see Lenkoski et al. (forthcoming)) confirms that the ex-
ogeneity condition is fulfilled and the instruments are not correlated with the error
term in the equation of interest. In other words, the legal and colonial history instru-
ment regressors do exert an effect on development, but not directly, only indirectly
through their impact on IPRs. We can thus be confident that the endogeneity of
IPRs has been addressed successfully and are able to discuss causal effects of IPRs
on development.
The impact of the aggregate patent index on development is, however, disappointing:
The aggregate patent index does not surpass the effectiveness threshold. Instead,
"Rule of Law" and geographic variables, such as tropics, malaria, and the South-East
Asia dummy show inclusion probabilities that are significantly larger than 50%. One
hypothesis could be that the weak effect of the aggregate patent index reflects the
sizable number of developing countries that achieve high marks for the breadth of
their patent laws, but whose intellectual property rights laws are not well enforced.
By disaggregating the patent index, we can find that the average patent duration
is largely identical for developing and developed countries. In contrast, a number
of developing countries exhibit a dismal score for the enforcement of their strin-
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Patent Protection Rule of Law Income
Incl. Post. Post. Incl. Post. Post. Incl. Post. Post.
Prob. Mean StDev Prob. Mean StDev Prob. Mean StDev
Instruments
English Language Fraction 100.0 1.807 0.536 9.3 0.839 0.531
French Legal Origin 55.6 −0.424 0.206 11.8 0.203 0.160
European Language Fraction 1.7 −0.633 0.458 98.7 1.298 0.294
Implied Trade Shares 26.8 0.240 0.148 3.5 0.110 0.139
Settler Mortality 8.4 −0.144 0.118 8.1 0.095 0.077
Development Determinants
South-East Asia 84.9 1.043 0.472
Rule of Law 80.7 0.702 0.260
Malaria (1994) 75.9 −0.716 0.307
Oil 70.1 0.572 0.277
Tropics 58.0 −0.592 0.325
Muslim 56.3 −0.006 0.003
Sub-Saharan Africa 51.7 −0.585 0.318
Catholic 47.4 0.008 0.004
Trade 34.1 0.252 0.192
Patent Protection 29.4 0.285 0.390
Latin America 18.4 0.433 0.394
No Sea Access 13.3 −0.233 0.210
Distance to Equator 12.2 −0.016 0.016
Mean Temperature 8.8 −0.012 0.034
Frost Area 6.9 0.351 0.417
Frost Days 4.0 0.006 0.026
Protestant 0.9 −0.001 0.008
Bayes Sargan P-value 0.59
Table 4.2: Instrumented Effects of Property Rights on Development
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gent patent rights. With an average patent enforcement index of 0.11, developing
countries’ enforcement mechanisms are almost eight times weaker than the average
protection afforded by developed economies in our sample.
To test our hypothesis formally, we replace the aggregate patent index by the patent
enforcement index and reestimate the above specification. With three valid instru-
ments (settler mortality, fraction of population speaking English, and French legal
origin), patent enforcement is well identified. The result of the Sargan test con-
firms the exogeneity of the instruments, which allows us to discuss causal results.
Table 3 reports strong positive effects of the enforcement of intellectual property
rights on development. Given the coefficient estimates in column 9, we find that a
one standard deviation increase in patent enforcement increases income by 42.0%.
This magnitude is impressive given that a one standard deviation increase in "Rule
of Law", the key regressor in the previous literature, increases income by a simi-
lar magnitude (by 41.7%). This result strongly suggests that both dimensions of
property protection, physical and intellectual, are crucial for development.41
To illustrate the impact of these two dimensions, consider two examples: 1995 per
capita income in the US has been about 4.3 times higher than in Venezuela. Our
results suggest that if Venezuela adopted the degree of intellectual property rights
enforcement and the level of Rule of Law to match the levels in the US, the income
difference between the two countries would only be about 11%. Our other example
compares the US and India. In 1995 US per capita income was about 14 times
greater than India’s. If India adopted US intellectual and physical property rights,
the predicted result would be a tenfold reduction in the income differences between
the two countries.
41 Our results are robust to the inclusion of alternative measures of IPRs and IPR enforcement.
In regressions that are available from the authors, we introduce sub-indices for duration,
coverage and protection from loss of rights. None of these indices changed our results or
surpassed effective thresholds.
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Patent Enforcement Rule of Law Income
Incl. Post. Post. Incl. Post. Post. Incl. Post. Post.
Prob. Mean StDev Prob. Mean StDev Prob. Mean StDev
Instruments
Engl. Language Fraction 100.0 0.647 0.162 9.3 0.839 0.531
Settler Mortality 89.5 −0.081 0.033 8.1 −0.095 0.077
French Legal Origin 51.5 −0.114 0.060 11.8 −0.203 0.160
Euro Language Fraction 21.5 0.143 0.088 98.7 1.298 0.294
Impl. Trade Share 0.4 −0.042 0.042 3.5 −0.110 0.139
Development Determinants
South-East Asia 90.9 0.987 0.317
Oil 75.6 0.566 0.257
Patent Enforcement 78.9 1.600 0.704
Malaria 1994 75.1 −0.603 0.267
Tropics 65.5 −0.591 0.295
Rule of Law 61.2 0.524 0.284
Latin America 51.8 0.658 0.314
Catholic 38.2 0.008 0.003
Trade 31.8 0.257 0.170
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.2 −0.544 0.345
Mean Temperature 18.9 −0.026 0.029
Muslim 17.5 −0.005 0.003
No Sea Access 13.5 −0.237 0.186
Frost Area 7.8 0.490 0.389
Distance Equator 7.5 −0.013 0.015
Frost Days 6.9 0.020 0.020
Protestant 0.5 −0.003 0.007
Bayes Sargan P-value 0.55
Table 4.3: Instrumented Effects of Patent Enforcement on Development
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Apart from highlighting the impact of the two dimensions of property protection
on development, our results also emphasize the importance of accounting for model
uncertainty at both the instrument and income stages. The approach allows us to
augment the findings by Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). Our ap-
proach discovers, for example, additional income determinants: While Rodrik et al.
(2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) find at best weak direct evidence of geography
on development, we find strong effects for geographic variables that influence the
level of development (e.g., Latin America, East Asia, tropics, and malaria).42 These
results are consistent with the results obtained by Lenkoski et al. (forthcoming) who
account for model uncertainty by using 2SBMA.
In line with the results by Rodrik et al. (2004), we also find that trade does not
surpass the effectiveness threshold. Our first stage results confirm those of Lenkoski
et al. (forthcoming) and Albouy (forthcoming) in that settler mortality is not an
effective instrument for Rule of Law in contrast to the findings of Rodrik et al.
(2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). However, we do find that settler mortality
serves as a strong instrument for the intellectual property dimension of institutions
as its inclusion probability for patent enforcement is almost 90%. All other results
conform to Lenkoski et al. (forthcoming), Rodrik et al. (2004), and Hall and Jones
(1999) in that common language variables are shown to be excellent instruments for
institutions.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
The literature that attempts to isolate development determinants has long focused
on the effects of physical property rights protection as a key determinant of the
observed differences in per capita incomes. Rule of Law (Rodrik et al., 2004) or
42 Kourtellos et al. (2010) previously challenged Rodrik et al. (2004)’s results on the basis of
parameter heterogeneity.
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Risk of Government Expropriation (Acemoglu et al., 2001) had previously been
identified as crucial institutional development determinants. Theoretical models of
development also highlight, however, the importance of intellectual property rights,
which we introduce to the development empirics literature in this chapter.
Cross-country growth and development regressions are well known to suffer from
substantial model uncertainty, and numerous candidate regressors and theories have
been proposed by the voluminous literature in outright "horse races" (Rodrik et al.,
2004; La Porta et al., 2004). Not only is the uncertainty about development determi-
nants substantial, but theories which suggest instruments to resolve endogeneity are
equally abundant. In this chapter, while introducing IPRs into the cross country de-
velopment literature, we account for endogeneity of the development determinants
and address model uncertainty at the income determinant and instrument levels
using Two-Stage Least Square Bayesian Model Averaging (2SBMA).
We find that intellectual property rights exert a strong impact on development if
they are properly enforced. The important insight is thus that both intellectual
and physical property rights are crucial determinants of cross-country income differ-
ences. Interestingly, our results suggest that the two dimensions of property rights
protection hold equally strong explanatory power: a one standard deviation increase
in "Rule of Law" increases per capita income by 42%, and this effect is identical to
the impact of a one standard deviation increase in patent enforcement, which is also
estimated to raise per capita income by the same amount. In line with previous
studies, we also find evidence for an effect of geographical variables (as malaria and
tropics) on development. We conclude from the data that the effective protection
of both physical and intellectual property rights, along with geography, are the key
determinants of a country’s economic development.
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Appendix A
Appendix to chapter 2: The
model in the narrow-gap case
In this section, we describe how the model in chapter 2 changes if it is solved for
an equilibrium in which the wage gap is narrow, i.e. ω ≥ α. The main change
occurs through the fact that now imitators of northern products cannot charge the
monopoly price, but charge the innovator’s marginal cost to exclude him from the
market. Equation (2.7a) becomes
pCN = w∗, piCN = (w∗ − w)x¯CNL. (2.7a′)
From this follows that the profits used in the cost-benefit equation (2.12c) change.
Accordingly, the equations which are derived with the help of this cost-benefit con-
dition also change. These are the equations for the rate at which northern varieties
are copied, the wage gap, and the equation for the employment in the southern
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research sector:
ιN =
(1− ω)(ρ+ θg)g
γ
1+γ∆1dφN(ρ+ θg)ω − (1− ω)g
(2.14b′)
ωε−1 − ωε
(
1 + (1− α)αε−1ρ+ θg
g
dφN
)
= γ1 + γ
dφN
φS
η∗ − (1− α)αε−1ρ+ θg
g
dφN
β
(2.18′)
`R =
(1− α)(g + ιS)
Λ1 + ιS + 1−αη?
1+γ
γ
φS
β
(
ιS
g
)2
Λ2
`− 1− α1− ωdφN
(
ιN
g
)2 (1− ω)g + ω(ρ+ θg)
Λ1 + ιN
 .
(2.17′)
The function f(ω) ≡ ωε−1 − ωε(1 + (1 − α)αε−1 ρ+θg
g
dφN) and the constant W ≡
γ
1+γ
dφN
φS
η∗−(1−α)αε−1 ρ+θg
g
dφN
β
are illustrated in figure A.1. From differentiating f(ω)
follows that df(ω)/dω < 0 if α/(1 + γ1+γ∆1dφN(ρ+ θg)) < ω. As the denominator of
the expression is greater than one the relation always holds in the narrow-gap case
(α ≤ ω). Consequently, the economy is on the downward sloping side of the wage
parabola.
ω = wS
wN1
f(ω)
W
φN ↑, φS ↑, β ↓
φN ↑
Figure A.1: Relative wage in the narrow-gap case.
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Further we know that W will be negative if the imitation rate of southern products
is non-negative (compare equation (2.14a)). Figure A.1 also illustrates the effects of
changes in the southern innovation productivity β and the levels of IPR protection
φN and φS. The wage gap is higher the higher the southern disadvantage in innova-
tion β and the lower the protection of southern goods φS: The higher β (the lower
φS) the more attractive it is to imitate. When the imitation rates ιN and ιS rise,
expected profits from innovation decline in both regions. At the same time, due to
the higher imitation rates, imitation is also more costly. As a result, the southern
wage declines more strongly than the northern one so that the wage gap increases.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the wage function, one can see that the
relative wage is falling (wage gap is rising) with stronger IPRs for northern goods
φN .
While not all balanced growth path effects can be derived analytically, numerical
analysis (available from the authors) showed that the remaining effects of changes
in IPRs and research efficiency are qualitatively similar to the wide-gap case.
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Appendix B
Appendix to chapter 2: The model
without southern innovation
We turn to a short description of the model of chapter 2 (Lorenczik and Newiak,
2011) for the case in which condition (2.13) is not satisfied such that southern
research employment `R is not positive in the general model. As research labor
cannot be negative, we set it to zero for both cases which restricts southern activity
to the imitation of the North and production. In this case, `R = `CS = `P = 0.
The only R&D functions are (2.4a) for northern innovation and (2.5a) for southern
imitation of northern goods. Likewise, the no-arbitrage conditions for southern
innovation and imitation of the South drop out. The labor market clearing condition
for the South becomes ` = `CN + `Y = aφN ιNNθ n˙CN + nCN x¯CNL.
Employment in the imitation sector `CN is still given by (2.16), but the imitation
rate in that equation is now different. Combining (2.12c) with the variety share ξ∗R
obtained from dividing the northern R&D function by N , using ξCN = ιNξ∗R/g and
substituting for `∗R from (2.15) we can solve for nCN x¯CN . To solve for the imitation
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rate we substitute nCN x¯CN and (2.16) in the above labor-market clearing condition.43
The resulting quadratic equations for wide- and narrow-gap case have each only one
positive solution which is given by:
ιN =
`
`∗
g2
2Λ1dφN
(
1 +
√
1 + 4Λ1dφN
g2
`∗
`
)
, ω ≤ α (B.1)
ιN =
`
`∗ g − Λ3
√
( `
`∗ g − Λ3)2 + 4 ``∗ gΛ1(dφN(1− α) + α1−ε)
2(dφN(1− α) + α1−ε) , ω ≥ α (B.1
′)
in which Λ3 = α1−ε(ρ + θg). The imitation rate is increasing in the relative size of
the South `/`∗ and decreasing in the level of IPR protection φN . The relative wage
is calculated as
ω =
(
ρ+ θg + ιN
ρ+ θg
g
dφN ιN
) 1
ε
, ω ≤ α (B.2)
ω = g(ρ+ θg + ιN)α
1−ε
(1− α)(ρ+ θg)dφN ιN + g(ρ+ θg + ιN)α1−ε , ω ≥ α. (B.2
′)
As in the case with southern innovation, the relative wage between South and North
is decreasing in the strength of IPR protection for northern goods. However, com-
pared to the case in which southern innovation is possible, the imitation rate ιN can
never be zero, because imitation and the production of imitated goods constitute
the only southern activities. From this fact and from (B.2′) follows that ω < 1 for
all parameter values. Consequently, the South can never catch up to the North in
wages in the no-innovation case.44
43 For the narrow-gap case, we additionally divide (2.12a) by (2.12c) to be able to substitute for
the relative wage ω.
44 If innovation is possible in the South, wages in the two regions can equalize if the southern
research sector catches up in efficiency. Setting ω = 1 in (2.18′) we obtain the parameter
combination under which wages are equal: ∆1(ρ + θg)(1/β − 1) = gη?/φS . This condition
says that the South can only catch up in wages if β = 1, i.e. if research in both regions is
equally efficient. As northern products are not subject to imitation any longer in that case,
equal wages require perfect IPR protection of southern innovations. This can be achieved by
letting φS →∞. Similarly β = 1 and η? = 0 lead to ω = 1.
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Finally, southern asset holdings and consumption expenditures change with the cease
of innovation in the South toA = ξCNdφNwaN1−θιN and e =
(
1 + (ρ+ gL)
ξCN
`
dφNaιNN
1−θ
)
w,
and the price index reduces to P = N
1
1−ε [ξ∗R(p∗R)1−ε + (1− ξ∗R)(pCN )1−ε]1/(1−ε).
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